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ABSTRACT 
 
This study aims to empirically identify agglomeration forces operating through skilled labor 
mobility. Specifically, this research uses a natural experiment in China regarding to skilled 
labor migration liberalization to examine the impact of skilled labor pool and knowledge 
availability on China’s industrial agglomeration. The current project centers on three 
progressive chapters on how skilled labor reallocation reshapes the economic geography in 
China. Chapter 2 estimates the response of the high-tech industrial agglomeration to high-
educated/high-skilled labor migration liberalization. It finds liberalizing interregional skilled 
labor mobility facilitates high-tech industrial agglomeration. Chapter 3 uses a narrowly 
controlled dataset to construct a case study on the China’s Food Processing industry. The 
research question posed is whether Food Processing firms co-locate to access talent pool. It 
finds evidence that the skilled labor pool affected the location decision of Food Processing 
firms. The result supports recent literature that the food and agribusiness sector is 
increasingly dependent on knowledge and high technology. Chapter 4 models and tests the 
knowledge effect through which a skilled labor policy increases industrial agglomeration. It 
analyzes relationship between a sector’s heterogeneity level and knowledge efficacy. It finds 
that heterogeneity alone does not maximize knowledge efficacy. 
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CHAPTER 1   
INTRODUCTION 
Industrial agglomeration refers to the advantages that firms producing similar goods attain by 
aligning themselves closer to each other (Fujita and Thisse, 2002). Industrial agglomeration 
tends to increase innovative outputs and enhance regional industrial competitive advantages 
(Furman, Porter, & Stern, 2002a). 
Agglomeration economies arise from several sources. Abundant natural resources have 
natural cost advantages and give rise to agglomerations (Ellison & Glaeser, 1999). Marshall 
(1879) formalizes and states that input sharing, labor pooling and knowledge spillovers are 
main sources for agglomeration economies. A dense cluster of intermediate suppliers and 
specialized labor reduce firms’ production costs and entice firms to agglomerate (Helsley & 
Strange, 2001). Spatial proximity also encourages mutual learning and informal knowledge 
transmission, leading firms to agglomerate (Kloosterman, 2008).  
Agglomeration sources operate on different microeconomic mechanisms (Duranton & Puga, 
2004). The sharing mechanism specifies that firms benefit from sharing intermediate 
suppliers, and exhibit increasing returns; the matching mechanism indicates that firms enjoy 
matching benefits from a thick local labor market, i.e. a greater division of labor results in a 
higher probability of matching between employers and employees; the learning mechanism 
points out spatially proximate workers exchange knowledge and create new knowledge 
(Duranton & Puga, 2004). 
Nevertheless, the literature has not reached agreement on the microeconomic mechanisms for 
industrial agglomeration (Duranton & Overman, 2005; Duranton & Puga, 2004; Fujita & 
Krugman, 2003).  
  2 
Firstly, a solid micro-model for a learning mechanism, especially knowledge spillovers, is 
rare ( Duranton & Puga, 2004; Fujita & Krugman, 2003). Spatial proximity of related firms 
and industries promotes face-to-face interaction, facilitating tacit knowledge diffusion 
(Geografiska, Series, & Geography, 1996). New knowledge and innovation derived from 
knowledge diffusion attracts firms to agglomerate. However, due to its subjective and 
intuitive nature, tacit knowledge leaves no paper trial to measure (Desouza, 2003; Krugman, 
1991). In addition, it is challenging to model spatial decay of a knowledge externality since it 
is difficult to estimate patent values across geographic locations (Berliant, Reed, & Wang, 
2006; Duranton & Puga, 2004). 
Secondly, a fundamental role in agglomeration mechanisms, heterogeneity, has not been fully 
explored (Duranton & Puga, 2004). New Economic Geography (NEG) theory states that 
increasing returns to scale and decreasing transport costs are a microeconomic foundation of 
agglomeration economies (Krugman, 1993). However, the NEG theory relies on a crucial 
assumption of identical firms, ignoring the heterogeneity nature across firms (Krugman, 
1991). New “New Economic Geography” theory introduces heterogeneity in explaining the 
agglomeration economies. Some theories posit heterogeneity as firm productivity, and states 
that more productive firms sort themselves to their core areas rather than to periphery areas 
(Baldwin & Okubo, 2005). While other scholars define heterogeneity as labor productivity 
(Glaeser & Resseger, 2010). More productive workers gravitate toward the large cities, while 
less productive workers sort themselves to small cities. The high living costs in large cities 
serve as a screen mechanism and rule out the less productive workers (Venables, 2010). 
Nonetheless, less literature focuses on the horizontal heterogeneity.  
Horizontal heterogeneity, measuring agents’ horizontal knowledge difference, plays an 
important role in firms’ geographical localization as it facilitates tacit knowledge 
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transmission (Berliant & Fujita, 2009; Berliant, Reed, & Wang, 2006). Literature debates 
whether heterogeneity alone leads to maximal knowledge efficacy. Berliant et al. (2006) state 
that knowledge creation results from heterogeneous firms to leverage new and different types 
of knowledge; while a competing theory models knowledge as having positive externalities 
derived from spillovers among homogeneous (like) firms. According to Marshall (1879), 
knowledge spillover is generated among people through same skilled interaction. Due to 
considerable difficulty to measure the horizontal heterogeneity, current literature’s analysis in 
heterogeneity and agglomeration is very thin (Duranton & Puga, 2004). Improving the 
microeconomic foundations of the knowledge effect that may support agglomeration 
economies motivates this study. 
Since the 1950s, the free flow of labor, an essential condition for industrial agglomeration, 
was restricted in China. China’s Household Registration System has limited inter-regional 
migration. In the 1970s, each local government limited both immigration and emigration in 
order to protect its industrial base (Bai et al., 2004; Lu and Tao, 2009). In 2002, several 
provinces started selective labor migration liberalization by introducing the Talent Residence 
Permit (TRP) policy. The TRP entitles Highly Educated/Highly Skilled (HEHS) workers, 
such as R&D engineers, technicians and scientists, to permanent residency. 
The TRP policy implementation creates a natural experiment to explore the effects of skilled 
labor pool on industrial agglomeration. Key research questions include: Does liberalizing 
interregional skilled labor mobility facilitate high-tech industrial agglomeration? Does a 
particular industry, Food Processing, co-locate in order to access the talent pool? Does 
heterogeneity alone lead to maximal knowledge production efficiency? 
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The hypotheses explored in the first two papers of this dissertation test whether skilled labor 
migration liberalization increase high-technology industrial agglomeration. Paper three tests 
whether heterogeneity alone leads to maximal knowledge efficacy. 
The current research improves previous literature in two ways. First, this study focuses on a 
unique migration policy, which targeted HEHS workers, and the response of the industrial 
agglomeration outcome in the high-tech industrial sectors. Second, this study identifies the 
knowledge mechanism through which skilled labor pool increases high-tech industrial 
agglomeration.  
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CHAPTER 2   
RETHINKING LOCAL PROTECTIONISM AND INDUSTRIAL 
AGGLOMERATION IN CHINA 
2.1  Introduction 
Firms in one industry concentrating in a particular region result in industrial agglomeration 
(Brenner, 2004).  Firms producing similar goods can attain benefits by locating closer to each 
other (Ellison & Glaeser, 1999).  Being located near their suppliers enables firms to purchase 
inputs efficiently and enjoy large quantity discounts; being closer to each other, local firms 
benefit from frequent communication and information exchanges, therefore accelerating 
innovation and technological upgrades.  When competitors are slow to catch up, the 
innovation and technology upgrades become a source of regional competitive advantage 
(Furman, Porter, & Stern, 2002b).  
However, an essential condition for industrial agglomeration, the free flow of labor, is 
restricted in China as each local government seeks to protect its industrial base (Lu & Tao, 
2009; Young, 2000).  Since 1978, the central government has undergone a series of fiscal 
decentralization policies and authorized provincial governments to collect taxes from local 
enterprises (Lu and Tao, 2009). The decentralization policies have inspired local 
governments to develop, as well as to protect, local industries to generate a substantial 
surplus. However, at the same time, protectionist policies restrain labor mobility so as to 
protect local job security.  At the heart of the problem is the conflict between local industrial 
polices and agglomeration economies. That is, interregional trade restrictions or labor 
migration restraints may limit the natural formation of industrial clusters and as a result make 
incumbent firms less competitive. This lack of competitiveness can lead to higher local 
prices, poorer quality, reduced innovation, or vulnerability to import substitution.   
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While research suggests that local protectionism hinders agglomeration in China (Bai, Du, 
Tao, & Tong, 2004; Lu & Tao, 2009; Young, 2000), the unanswered part of this question is 
the process through which localist policies slow down industrial agglomeration. It is 
important to understand the pathway by which this happens so the full impact of regional 
industrial policies, such as interstate/provincial taxes, labor movement restriction, or local 
content mandates, can be measured in terms of competitiveness. 
This study aims to investigate the relationship between labor immobility and industrial 
agglomeration.  More specifically, this study assesses the impact of eligibility for permanent 
residency in cities for high-educated and high-skilled (HEHS) workers and 
“Talent   Residence   Permit” (TRP) policies on the agglomeration of China’s high-tech 
manufacturing industries. The research hypothesis is that HEHS labor immobility slows 
down high-tech industrial agglomeration. The research employs a set of natural experiments 
to estimate the response of the industrial agglomeration when liberalizing HEHS migration. 
This chapter finds a positive impact of policy on high-tech industrial agglomeration, 
revealing that skilled labor immobility slows down high-tech industrial agglomeration. Other 
traditional determinants for industrial agglomeration: scale economies and proximity to 
markets are also found to promote industrial agglomeration in the high-tech industry.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I provides a review of relevant literature 
while section II articulates the skilled-labor liberalization policy.  Section III describes the 
methodology and the data.  Section IV presents the estimation results, followed with a 
robustness check in section V.  Section VI concludes the paper.  
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2.2  Literature Review 
Over the years, agglomeration has gained interest because it is an important influence on 
firms’ location decisions and regional competiveness. Increasing-return technologies and 
knowledge spillovers arise in association with agglomerations, and provide sources for 
endogenous growth (Ellison & Glaeser, 1999). Agglomeration economies rely on a crucial 
assumption of free flow of labor, goods and services across regions (Lu and Tao, 2009). Yet 
localist policies may limit the natural formation of industrial agglomeration by impeding 
interregional trade, imposing labor immobility and restraining knowledge spillover (Lu & 
Tao, 2009; Sun, Bai, & Xie, 2011). 
Recent literature shows that regional protectionism slows down industrial agglomeration in 
China (Lu & Tao, 2009; Sun et al., 2011). Nevertheless, the current findings are limited in 
three aspects: they do not specify the related discrete local policies; they focus on the 
relationship between migration and labor-market segmentation without linking the migration 
with the firms’ location decisions; the research is restricted to a limited number of province 
(Fan, Hall, & Wall, 2009; Lu & Tao, 2009; Sun et al., 2011). 
This study improves on the previous literature in three ways. First, the current paper focuses 
on a particular migration policy—the Talent Residence Permit (TRP), which targeted HEHS 
workers—to estimate the response of the industrial agglomeration outcome in the high-tech 
industrial sectors. Second, this research extends on previous research by examining the effect 
of labor liberalization on the entire nation (thirty one provinces). Third, the present analysis 
differentiates between the high-skilled workers’ specific labor liberalization policy and the 
overall labor mobility policy. In sum, this study is able to provide a closer look at the 
interaction between market forces that determines the industrial agglomeration and 
protectionist policies. 
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In the 1950s, China initiated an unbalanced development strategy emphasizing heavy 
industry (Chan, 2010). In 1958, the State Council of China established the Household 
Registration System (HRS) to protect urban job security. Each person is born with 
identification as rural or urban in a specific administrative unit and is confined to that unit 
(Chan, 2001; Chan, 2010). In such way, both inflow and outflow migration is restricted. 
In 1978, China experienced a transition from a centrally planned economy to a market 
economy. The State Council launched reforms allowing for greater labor mobility by 
gradually allowing interregional and rural-urban migration. Then, Fujian and Shanghai 
started providing permanent residency to selected labor categories, in particular HEHS 
workers. The Talent Residence Permit (TRP) policies encourage talented workers to move 
into cities to improve the knowledge spillovers and competiveness of the province. The TRP 
policy entitles permanent residency in cities for R&D engineers, technicians, scientists, 
managers and other employees with a college degree or above, in-depth knowledge of 
science and engineering, a vocational certificate or management experience.  Employers 
apply for permanent residency for employees who may engage in R&D that will increase 
scientific knowledge; aid in the design of new equipment, processes and structures; or 
contribute to new computer applications (Fan et al., 2009; Sun et al., 2011). From 2002 to 
2006, a number of provinces, including Fujian, Shanghai, Beijing, Guangdong, Jiangxi, 
Liaoning, Hunan, Shandong, Shanxi, Zhejiang, Jilin, Sichuan, Inner Mongol and Shaanxi 
implemented the TRP policy (figure 1). 
The implementation of TRP policies varies across, time and provinces. Different provinces 
have adopted the policies in different years, and the specific TRP policy varies from province 
to province depending on specific HEHS needs (table 1).  
Recent research has examined China’s localist policies and their effect on labor markets and 
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industrial behavior. Lu and Tao (2009) believe that regional governments often seek to 
protect the state-owned enterprises from outside competition. They test for and ultimately 
find a negative relationship between the share of state-owned enterprises employment and the 
level of agglomeration within China’s manufacturing sector. However, they do not identify 
the causality between localism and industrial agglomeration, nor do they explain the role 
played by the overall change in Chinese migration policy. Fan et al. (2009) examine three 
high-tech industries in Dalian city and find that labor liberalization is more easily granted to 
individual migrants with desired skills. Yet their study is restricted in Dalian city. Sun et al. 
(2011) find that labor migration liberalization does not significantly affect short-term, low-
skilled labor force pooling in urban areas. Their study, though, is restricted to only eight 
provinces. Sun et al. (2011), like Lu and Tao (2009), examined the labor market at large, 
regardless of the differences between low and high skilled workers in labor pool. Sun et al. 
(2011) also neglects to evaluate the effects on industry location choice.  
A large body of literature investigates policy evaluation through natural experiments. Though 
most researchers have not directly studied the labor migration liberalization policies in China, 
those studies do shed light on this paper in terms of how to identify the policy effects. Gruber 
and Yelowitz (1999) and Yelowitz (1995) utilize a triple difference estimation strategy to 
study Medicaid expansion in United States. The Medicaid expansion occurred at a 
differential pace across the states. Even within states, the expansion varied at differential 
qualifying individuals based on their children’s age. The expansion creates variation over 
time, across states and within states. Besley and Burgess (2004) use state and year-specific 
policy variables, which identify policy effects as the deviation in state-specific trend after the 
policy shock. The new trend deviates from its past trend in absence of policy shock. Autor 
(2003) adds lead policy variables and lag policy variables and shows that anticipatory effects 
from lead policy variables are close to zero. The result supports the argument on directions of 
  12 
causality that the policy affected the dependent variable, not vice versa. Admittedly, much 
debate on difference-in-differences arises in the possible endogeneity of the interventions 
(Athey & Imbens, 2006; Besley & Case, 2000; Duflo & Saez, 2003). 
Other factors might also influence the formation of industrial agglomeration. Vertical 
disintegration is closely related with industrial agglomeration (Holmes & Stevens, 2002; 
Holmes, 1999). Vertical disintegration indicates an industry purchases a high portion of 
intermediate inputs from specialized suppliers (Holmes, 1999). Specialized suppliers refer to 
firms that take over increasing return to scale functions and specialize in “different stages of 
the production process” (Stigler, 1951; Holmes, 1999, p. 316). The production process 
consists of both increasing return to scale functions and decreasing return to scale functions. 
When the industry is growing, the market magnitude enlarges; as a consequence, the growing 
industry outsources the increasing-returns-to-scale functions. New firms take over those 
functions and become specialized suppliers (Stigler, 1951). Firms tend to concentrate in areas 
where they can easily obtain inputs from specialized suppliers (Stigler, 1951; Holmes, 1999). 
Yet when the industry is mature, the market shrinks too, not being able to support the 
survival of small intermediate suppliers (Stigler, 1951). As consequence, firms internalize 
production rather than outsourcing, leading to vertical integration.  To sum up, the sign of 
vertical disintegration is indeterminate; hence there is no hypothesis for vertical 
disintegration. 
Scale economies also positively relate to industrial agglomeration (Holmes & Stevens, 2002; 
Krugman & Venables, 1996). Increasing return to scale is an essential force that attracts firms 
to co-locate (Ottaviano & Puga, 1998). The larger firms reflect consolidation, merger, and 
survival, resulting from increasing returns when serving larger markets. With larger sales, 
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agglomerated firms generate higher profits and attract new firms to enter in response to the 
profits (Ottaviano and Puga, 1998).  
Firms co-locate to reduce transport costs and to attain natural advantages (Marshall, 1879). 
Through these advantages, firms may be able to reduce unit costs, exploit economies of scale 
and potentially expand their markets beyond the local economy.  Firms also locate close to 
customer market to reduce transport costs and improve marketing (Ellison & Glaeser, 1999).  
High-tech industries are defined as industries recruiting a high portion of scientists, engineers 
and technicians (Hecker, 2005). Scientific, engineering, and technician occupations are high-
technology occupations. Hecker (2005) classifies industries according to their high-
technology occupations relative to the average for all industries. High-tech industries refer to 
industries in which the employment in technology-oriented occupations account for a 
proportion of that industry’s total employment that is at least twice the average for all 
industries (Hecker 2005). 
To summarize, the present study focuses on HEHS employment-specific liberal permit 
policies on a nationwide scope, and examines the impact of skill-based labor mobility on 
high-tech industries location decision. The present research extends current understanding of 
the interaction between labor policy and industrial agglomeration. This chapter tests the 
following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1. The degree of high-tech industrial agglomeration is positively correlated with 
TRP policies.  
Hypothesis 2. Scale economy is positively correlated with industrial agglomeration. 
Hypothesis 3. Proximity to consumer markets is positively correlated with agglomeration. 
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2.3   Methods and Data 
In this section, we first describe a measure of industrial agglomeration. Second, we introduce 
the difference-in-difference-in-differences (triple difference) model used to test the effects of 
TRP policy on high-tech industrial agglomeration. Third, we discuss the construction of the 
treatment variable and the industries that are affected by the TRP policies. Fourth, we 
describe the estimation model, and finally we discuss data and control variables. 
2.3.1  Measurement of Industrial Agglomeration 
The employment location quotient is commonly employed to measure regional industrial 
agglomeration (Holmes and Stevens, 2002). It compares the ratio of industry i’s employment 
in province j to the total manufacturing employment in province; relative to the ratio in the 
entire nation (Bai et al., 2004). 
     
                       ⁄
                     ⁄
 
where eij is employment in industry i in province j; ej is total local employment in province j; 
Ei is employment in industry i in the nation; E is total employment in the nation.  The LQ is 
equal to 1 when the percentage of employment within a particular industry in a local area is 
equal to the national average percentage of employment (O’Donoghue & Gleave, 2004). If 
the LQ is greater than 1, then the industry is “over represented” in the region and is likely to 
constitute agglomeration since the industry has an above average concentration of 
employment (O’Donoghue and Gleave, 2004). 
2.3.2   Methods 
This study adopts a set of natural experiments to identify the effect of skilled labor migration 
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liberalization on high-tech industrial agglomeration. China implemented TRP policies in 
several provinces at different times. The expansion segmented the labor market into skilled 
and unskilled labor, therefore enabling us to explore different effects on the manufacturing 
industries according to their need for skilled labor. TRP policies create “treatment” and 
“control” groups conditioned on their HEHS employment intensity, referred to as high-tech 
and low-tech industries.  
Two crucial assumptions are adopted: (1) there is no contemporaneous shock to high-tech 
industrial agglomeration in the same province-year as the TRP policies, and (2) TRP 
implementation is independent of the high-tech industrial agglomeration relative to low-tech 
industrial agglomeration. These two assumptions indicate the TRP expansion provides 
exogenous variation and allows for causal interpretation of the effects of skilled-labor 
migration on high-tech industrial agglomeration. There may be situations in which the 
expansion is not independent of provincial industrial agglomeration. We address this issue in 
the robustness checks section. 
This research captures the causal effect by measuring the differences in the high-tech 
industries’ relative industrial agglomeration over low-tech industries in provinces that 
adopted the TRP policy, relative to non-policy adopting provinces. 
Ceteris paribus, a positive relationship between TRP policies and high-tech industrial 
agglomeration supports the claim that skilled labor immobility slows down industrial 
agglomeration. The pre-treatment differences in policy provinces and non-policy provinces 
are shown in figure 2. The graph shows minor effects one year before the TRP policy was 
adopted, with an increase after TRP implementation.  
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Admittedly, this study still faces many challenges. TRP policies create variation within 
provinces because each province set up different education/skill thresholds for permanent 
residence permit application eligibility. Though it is possible to identify the timing and 
provinces of TRP policies, there was significant heterogeneity in the impacts of TRP policies 
within the provinces, heterogeneity that rough high-tech versus low-tech categories cannot 
capture. 
2.3.3   Construction of TRP Eligibility Variable 
The treatment group is the high-tech industries within experimental provinces that adopted 
the TRP policies. Lacking the information on high-technology occupations, this analysis uses 
R&D employment as a proxy for high-tech employment. In each manufacturing industry, the 
R&D employment share varies over the sample years, from 2001-2010. Manufacture of 
Medicine has the highest relative R&D share, with 10.0 times the average for all industries in 
2003, but it declines to 1.8 times the average in 2006. Another example is Food Processing: 
the share of R&D employment is 2.3 times the average in 2001, and falls to 0.3 times the 
average in 2006 (table 2). Therefore, this research defines high-tech industries as HEHS 
intensive industries. HEHS intensive industries are industries with R&D employment shares 
above the average for all industries through the sample years. This research defines low-tech 
industries as low-skill intensive industries, to include industries with R&D employment share 
below the average through the sample years.  All other industries are grouped as Semi-skill 
intensive industries.  
This analysis denotes HEHS intensive industries as Group I, Semi-skill intensive industries as 
Group II, Low-skill intensive industries as Group III (table 3). The treatment group is Group 
I, which contains industries most affected by the TRP policies. This study excludes twelve 
semi-skill intensive industries in group II, which may be affected by the TRP policy. The 
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control group is Group III, referring to industries least affected by the permanent residency 
policies. This study constructs two measures for TRP treatment variable TRPijt. The treatment 
dummy variable is computed as: 
 ( )               (          
 )   (                  
 )   (    
             );  
Dummy treatment variables do not capture the industrial differences in R&D share within 
high-tech groups. In order to test the model specification, this study also constructs the 
continuous treatment variable, which is computed as:  
( )                   
 (          
 )   (                  
 )                     (    
             ); 
where province
* 
is the experimental provinces and year
* 
is the TRP policy year that take 
effect (table 4). 
2.3.4  Estimation Model  
Following Gruber and Yelowitz (1999), the basic regression specification is 
(   )                                                     
(   )                                               
j indexes provinces, I indexes industries, t indexes time. LQijt measures industrial 
agglomeration using location quotient. TRPdummyijt is the high-tech group industries in 
policy provinces after effective years. TRPdummyijt captures the average treatment effect of 
  18 
TRP policy on high-tech group. R&Dsharei refers to an industry’s relative R&D share to 
average for all industries. R&Dsharei captures the additional effects of higher R&D share on 
industrial agglomeration. 
TRPcontinuousijt refers to each industry within a high-tech group varying on R&D share, in 
policy provinces and after effective years TRPcontinuousijt captures the average treatment 
effect of TRP policy on each industry within a high-tech group with respect to their R&D 
share. TRPijt (TRPdummyijt and TRPcontinuousijt) is the independent variable of primary 
interest (with    hypothesized to be positive, in accordance with hypothesis 1). δjt is a set of 
provincej*yeart dummy variables capturing variation within province at each year, calculated 
as provincej*yeart. The term Xijt is a vector of variables controlling for traditional 
determinants for industrial agglomeration, including vertical disintegration, scale economy 
and proximity to markets (Ellison & Glaeser, 1999; Krugman & Venables, 1996).  
The parameters    captures the variation in the dependent variables specific to high-tech 
industries (relative to low-tech industries) in policy provinces (relative to non-policy 
provinces) (Gruber, 1994). The    provides estimates of the “mean effect” (Kim, 2013) of the 
TRP policy on certain provinces directly targeting high-tech industries. Therefore the policy 
effect, is captured by comparing the difference between differences of high-tech and low-tech 
industrial agglomeration within policy provinces, with the differences within non-policy 
provinces (Equation 4). Following Kim (2013) X includes all of the other covariates, such as 
vertical disintegration, scale economy and proximity to customers, and fixed effect.  
( )     { [    |                        ]   [ |                        ]} 
 { [    |                        ]   [    |                        ]} 
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2.3.5   Data 
This study uses China’s provincial 2-digit industrial statistics as the basic statistic data: 1) 
China Labor Statistical Yearbook from 2001-2010; 2) China Industry Economy Statistical 
Yearbook from 2001-2010 and 3) China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology. 
Both China Labor Statistical Yearbook and China Industry Economy Statistical Yearbook are 
collected at 2-digit industry   level, conducted by   China’s   National   Bureau   of   Statistics, 
from 2001-2010. China Labor Statistical Yearbook provides employment for thirty 2-digit 
manufacturing industries for 31 provinces. China Statistical Yearbook on Science and 
Technology reports R&D employment by industry for the period 2001-2010. China Industry 
Economy Statistical Yearbook includes information on industry output, industry sales, 
purchased inputs, value added, number of firms and total employment, etc.  
Control Variables 
Following Holmes (1999), Lu and Tao (2009), this study measured vertical disintegration as 
the ratio of purchased-inputs to total output (equation 5). Holmes (1999) found a positive 
correlation between vertical disintegration and industrial agglomeration. However, Stigler 
(1995) suggested vertical disintegration in growing industries, as specialized suppliers 
emerge to provide raw materials and training skilled labor. When industries began to decline, 
the suppliers shrink too. Finally the surviving firms will internalize specialized equipment 
and manufacturing and become vertical integrated. The sign of vertical disintegration is 
undetermined. 
( )                         
                                        
              
 
Scale economies also positively relate with industrial agglomeration (Krugman & Venables, 
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1996). Following Lu and Tao (2009), this study constructed an average firm size variable, 
defined as the total output of an industry divided by the number of firms in the industry as a 
proxy for scale economy (equation 6).  
( )                
                              
                                 
 
Firms also locate themselves closer to one another to reduce transportation costs. Proxies for 
proximity to markets are interactions of the share of the industry’s output that is sold to 
consumers with population density and with the difference between a state’s share of income 
and its share of manufacturing employment (Ellison & Glaeser, 1999). Here population 
density is calculated as the total province population divided by province area, measured in 
square kilometer (equation 7).  
( )            
                
                     
                     
Table 5 describes industrial characteristics, showing the means of variables. There are 4 
industries in HEHS Intensive group, 12 industries in Semi-skill Intensive group and 12 
industries in Low-skill Intensive group. The location quotient and vertical disintegration stay 
quite similar across different types of industries. Scale economy and proximity show strong 
variance across high-tech and low-tech industries. For high-tech industries, the R&D share 
relative to average is 3 times relative R&D share in low-tech industries. However, the Semi-
skill Intensive industries have the largest R&D employment in the entire nation.  
2.3.6  Results 
Table 6 presents evidence of the effect of TRP policies on high-tech industrial agglomeration, 
through the coefficient estimate on TRPijt. Hypothesis 1 is confirmed that HEHS labor 
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migration liberalization results in a positive effect on high-tech industrial agglomeration.  
Following analogous analysis from Gruber and Yelowitz (1999), the constructed treatment 
variable, TRPijt, varies across three dimensions: relative R&D share, province and year. 
Gruber and Yelowitz (1999) note that each of these variables could be independently 
correlated with high-tech industrial agglomeration. Therefore, we control for these 
dimensions by including a continuous variable of industries’ relative R&D share. Specifically 
R&D share reflects the level of R&D compared with the average for all manufacturing. 
Doing so captures the effect of skilled labor intensity on industrial agglomeration. Province-
year dummies control for provincial specific characteristics that affect industrial 
agglomeration each year. 
To illustrate, the TRP policy creates various impacts over time and across provinces 
(Yelowitz, 1995), since different provinces implement the policy at different times.  For 
example, China encouraged the development of a large number of export-oriented industries 
and experienced a rapid growth in GDP in the early 21
st
 century. The macroeconomic growth 
might attract high-tech firms to co-locate independent of the TRP policies. Equally possible, 
firms might locate in Shanghai, for example, because it is a coastal city with comprehensive 
infrastructure facilities and financial support.  High-tech firms choose to locate near related 
technology-oriented industries.  
In addition, we consider other policies that might be correlated with the TRP policy and have 
significant impacts on high-tech industrial agglomeration. An example would be the overall 
labor migration liberalization targeting both skilled and unskilled labor. The solution is that 
the overall migration liberalization policy varies only within provinces over time (Gruber & 
Yelowitz, 1999), so an interaction term, provincej*yeart, which is represented in the 
regression model as δjt, could gauge the variation.  The TRP policy not only creates variation 
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across provinces and over time, it also segments industries by conditioning their R&D share.  
In other words, the TRP policy creates variation within province/year. The TRP policy effect 
is identified only through the interaction of R&Dsharei, provincej and yeart. Therefore, we 
reach the “difference-in-difference-in-differences” model: we include the year*province 
interaction to gauge the possible correlations between TRP and other policies that might 
affect high-tech industries across provinces and over time.  
Column (1) represents the specification using TRPijt dummy variable to proxy the treatment 
effect. TRPijt is equal to one for industries whose relative R&D share is greater than the 
average for all industries, in policy provinces and effective years of operation of these 
policies. Column (2) uses the TRPijt continuous variable to proxy the treatment effect. 
TRPcontinuousijt is equal to the industry’s relative R&D share to the average for all 
industries, in policy provinces and effective years. The TRPcontinuousijt variable is used to 
capture the differences of industrial relative R&D share, which is absent in the TRPdummyijt 
variable and improves the model specification.  
All specifications represent positive and significant coefficients for the treatment variable 
(TRPdummyijt and TRPcontinuousijt). The estimation result shows evidence that high-tech 
industries do respond to the availability of HEHS labor pools and co-locate in order to access 
talent. In column (1), Relative R&D share shows a positive and significant effect on high-
tech industries’ location quotient. Increase in relative R&D employment share indicates that 
as an industry becomes high-technology intensive, it is inclined to respond to the availability 
of HEHS labor pools.  
However, we need to be cautious when interpreting the positive effects of relative R&D share 
on industrial agglomeration. Since we only have the R&D employment for each 
manufacturing industry at a national level, we implicitly assume homogeneous relative R&D 
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share in an industry across provinces. Due to heterogeneous characteristics across provinces, 
using the national R&D share to define high-tech categories might not be representative at 
the provincial level. Particularly when a high-tech firm owns multiple establishments across 
the nation, those establishments in the same industry will be counted as one firm. The spatial 
distribution of establishments might be different from the firm. Some establishments might 
focus on low-skill intensive manufacturing production function, yet be categorized in high-
tech industry as they belong to a high-tech multi-plant firm. 
The result provides evidence for a positive relationship between migration and agglomeration 
economies. Selective migration policies encourage skilled labor movement. Talented workers 
are more likely to accumulate human capital and exert higher productivity when locating 
together (World Bank, 2009). Knowledge transmission among workers accelerates increasing 
return to human capital, and leads to localization of high-tech industries (World Bank, 2009). 
The result shows a negative and significant coefficient for vertical disintegration, revealing 
that concentrated high-tech industries are increasingly vertically integrated. Following Stigler 
(1951) theory, the result supports that high-tech industry becomes a mature industry and 
tends to decline.  
As expected in hypotheses 2, greater scale economies lead to greater industrial 
agglomeration. Increasing return to scale arises when firms expand production. Firms could 
purchase a large amount of intermediate inputs and gain buying power; in addition, average 
costs decrease as more products share fixed costs (World Bank, 2009). 
The proximity coefficient is positive and significant for all specifications. The result is 
consistent with hypotheses 3: being closer to dense population centers leads to greater 
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agglomeration. Firms tend to locate close to customers so as to reduce transport costs. The 
benefit generated by proximity to consumer markets outweighs the possible congestion costs.  
The provincial unobservable variables are quite powerful in this model. Of the 31 provinces, 
21 of the dummy coefficient values were significant at the .10 level when compared to 
Beijing; with 18 being positive and 3 being negative. The interpretation is that provincial 
characteristics significantly affect the location clustering of high-tech industrial 
agglomeration relative to Beijing. On the other hand, the year effects on the model are 
minimal, only showing significant effect in year 2010 compared to 2001, the base year.   
2.4   Robustness Check 
2.4.1  Dependent Variable 
Location quotient measures the relative ratio of local industrial employment to national 
industrial employment (O’Donoghue and Gleave, 2004). An industry is likely to agglomerate 
when the LQ is over 1 since the industry has relatively more concentrated employment 
(O’Donoghue and Gleave, 2004). Therefore, we utilize a binary logistic regression and 
confirm that TRP policies contribute to likelihood of being agglomerated. The regression 
result is shown in table 7. 
This binary logistic regression result confirms hypotheses 1 that HEHS labor pool has a 
positive effect on high-tech industrial agglomeration. Ceteris paribus, increasing R&D 
employment intensity is an important determinant for the high-tech industries’ probability of 
being agglomerated. Proximity to population and markets also shows a significant, positive 
impact on high-tech industries’ likelihood of being agglomerated. 
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2.4.2   Missing Data  
Not all data exists for all industries across all provinces and years. The China Industry 
Economy Statistical Yearbook does not provide data for total output, purchased inputs, 
number of firms and industry sale in ten industries: 1) Manufacture of Textile Wearing, 
Apparel, Footwear and Caps; 2) Manufacture of Leather, Fur, Feather and Its Products; 3) 
Processing of limbers, Manufacture of Wood, Bamboo, Rattan, Palm and Straw Products; 4) 
Manufacture of Furniture; 5) Printing, Reproduction of Recording Media; 6) Manufacture of 
Articles for Culture, Education and Sport Activities; 7) Manufacture of Rubber; 8) 
Manufacture of Plastic; 9) Manufacture of Artwork, Other Manufacture and 10) Recycling 
and Disposal of Waste. These variables are used to calculate the three control variables: 
Vertical Disintegration, Scale Economies and Proximity. Therefore, the ten industries are 
dropped, reducing the number of data points from 9,300 to 6,200. The dependent variable, the 
location quotient, has 1.34% missing data. All treatment data exist in the remaining data set. 
Vertical Disintegration has 2.56% missing data; Scale Economies have 2.27% and Proximity 
has 10% missing data in the entire 6,200 data set. Of these 6,200 data points, 14.8% were 
imputed due to missing values. 
For comparison, we present results from different approaches dealing with missing values.  
First, we completely delete the observations with missing values (table 6).  This method 
maintains an unbiased estimator under the assumption of missing at completely random 
(MCAR)
1
. However, MCAR is a strong assumption, which assumes missing data occurs in 
the process of random selection.
2
  In some cases, the reason for missing data is that the 
industry does not exist in a particular province. In this case, the missing values cannot be 
adjusted using MCAR; if this assumption were to fail, the estimation using listwise deletion 
                                                        
1 http://www.uvm.edu/~dhowell/StatPages/More_Stuff/Missing_Data/Missing.html 
2 http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/seminars/missing_data/mi_in_stata_pt1.htm 
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would be biased. More general assumptions are missing at random (MAR) or missing not at 
random (MNAR).
3
  
We use multivariate normal model (MVN) and the chained equation model (ICE) to deal 
with missing data under MAR or MNAR assumption
4
. MVN assumes all variables in the 
imputation model follow a multivariate normal distribution and the missing values are 
estimated using regression (Little & Rubin, 2002). The ICE model uses a set of univariate 
models to impute missing data in each variable.
5
  We present both the ICE estimation (table 
8) and the MVN estimation (table 9) for comparison. We find a significant positive relation 
between the TRPELIG and location quotient in the DDD specification in both the ICE and 
MVN estimation models. The result reveals that the HEHS labor pool serves as an important 
determinant for high-tech industrial agglomeration. The coefficient for TRPELIG becomes 
insignificant when we drop the province and year interaction. Economic situations, or other 
policies correlated with TRP, may influence high-tech industries more than low-tech 
industries, which accounts for the non-trivial explanation power in our story (Gruber and 
Yelowitz, 1999; Gruber, 1994).  Both ICE and MVN models show that being closer to 
markets does have significant positive effects on high-tech industrial agglomeration.  
2.4.3  Independence of TRP Policy 
Fan et al. (2009) raises an important concern that in software, biotech and digital 
manufacturing in coastal cities where there are shortages of HEHS workers, permits are more 
easily granted. This concern challenges the independence of the policy to industrial 
agglomeration. However, the identification strategy inherently avoids the problem. This study 
measures the difference between relative high-tech industrial agglomerations versus low-tech 
                                                        
3 http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/seminars/missing_data/mi_in_stata_pt1.htm 
4 http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/seminars/missing_data/mi_in_stata_pt1.htm 
5 http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/seminars/missing_data/mi_in_stata_pt1.htm 
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industries within policy provinces, with the differences within non-policy provinces.  
Therefore, the assumption for the causal interpretation of the regression is that TRP 
implementation is independent of the relative industrial agglomeration of high-tech industries 
versus low-tech industries, not the level of high-tech industrial agglomeration.  Therefore, as 
long as it is not affected by the relative agglomeration of high-tech, the TRP implementation 
provides exogenous variation.  
Intuitively, bias may be present in our model because HEHS dependent industries logically 
might lobby to impose the TRP policy. However, the TRP policies are part of the overall 
Chinese economic reform that was to move from a planned economy towards a market 
economy. Since the 1980’s, China has launched economic reforms by releasing segments of 
the economy from central control (Young, 2000). There have been many calls to change the 
inherent distortion policies, including the labor market, by gradually allowing rural-urban and 
interregional migration (Security, 1985). TRP is a special migration reform encouraging 
HEHS mobility liberalization. The TRP policies are identified as part of social reform and not 
an industry-based strategy. Therefore, while the TRP may benefit only some industries, the 
policy is part of a larger plan to allow the freer flow of labor. Thus, an endogenous lobby 
effort by HEHS industry is likely not the driver to TRP implementation. 
Still, we worry about the direction of causality. Some provinces, like Jiangxi, Hunan, 
Shaanxi, duplicate the policies in coastal provinces in order to catalyze local industrial 
agglomeration (Zhang, 2009). Therefore, the TRP implementation is a strategy to facilitate 
the formation of high-tech industrial agglomeration, not the result of it.  We employ a test for 
causality to check whether past implementation of the TRP affects the future location 
quotient while future TRP implementation does not lead to higher location quotients in 
previous years.  Following Autor (2003), Angrist and Pischke (2008), we add “lagging” 
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policy dummies that occur before the TRP adoption; and “leading” policy dummies that 
occur after the TRP adoption (Autor 2003).  As shown in equation (8), m= 4 and q = 1, where 
m reflects four periods before TRP adoption, and q reflects the one period after TRP 
adoption. Thus there are five TRP policy implementation dummies beginning four years in 
the past, the current period, and one period in the future.  
 (8)          ∑               
 
    ∑               
 
                                    
The estimation results support the hypothesis 1 as to the direction of causality (figure 3).  
These results show no effect in the year before the TRP policy is implemented; the response 
fluctuates over the next a few years. This pattern supports hypothesis 1 as to the direction of 
causality.  
2.4.4  Market Potential 
Another possible determinant for firms’ location decision is market potential. Market 
potential measures the intensity of accessing markets (Harris, 1954). Firms would like to 
choose locations that access inputs markets and consumer markets (Schulze, 2007). The 
purchasing power of all accessible markets determines the potential demand for local 
production (Hanson, 2005). According to Harris (1954), the market potential is defined as the 
summation of each location’s market access weighted by it’s distance to that market (Harris, 
1954). This definition is formulated by Bai, Ma, & Pan (2012) as: 
     ∑
     
   
 
   
 
where      is market potential index in province j and year t,       is province GDP in 
province i other than j in year t,     is the distance from province i to j. Harris (1954) uses 
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final consumption to indicate demand, and here the final consumption demand is measured as 
province GDP. The distance to objective province j from all other provinces i is measured as 
direct Euclidean distance that connects the central point of two provinces. First define a 
character ID label for each province
6
; second calculate Euclidean or Great Circle distance 
between two central id in full     matrix in kilometers7. The hypothesized sign of market 
potential is indeterminate depending on the influences of demand on industrial 
agglomeration. When the industrial agglomeration is demand driven, then the market 
potential is hypothesized to be positive and significant; when the industrial agglomeration is 
supply driven, then the coefficient of market potential is hypothesized to be negative and 
significant; when the influence of demand linkage is trivial on firms’ location decision, then 
the coefficient of market potential is hypothesized to be insignificant (table 10). 
Table 10 assesses the importance of market access on firms’ location decision (Hanson, 
2005). The result shows the influence of market potential on industrial agglomeration. The 
coefficient for market potential measures the effects of accessing markets to all other 
provinces on the particular province’s attractiveness for industries. We found that in both 
dummy treatment and continuous treatment estimation models, the market potential does not 
have strong explanatory power to high-tech industrial concentration. In presence of market 
potential variable, treatment variable and other traditional agglomeration determinants still 
have strong explanatory power for firms’ location decision. We also examine the impacts of 
first-difference market potential on high-tech industrial concentration (AppendixA 1.2). In a 
word, market potential gauges the special distribution of demand into firms’ location 
decision. Having access to markets does not show strong incentive to increase the 
attractiveness of a particular region to firms and lead to industrial agglomeration. 
                                                        
6 http://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/rgeos/rgeos.pdf 
7 http://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/sp/sp.pdf 
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2.4.5   Spatial Analysis 
We also are concerned with the spatial autocorrelations across provinces. The existence of 
spatial spillover effects will weaken the causal interpretation of the positive effects of TRP 
policy on high-tech industrial agglomeration, as the increasing high-tech industrial 
agglomeration might be caused by spatial spillover from neighboring provinces rather than 
skilled labor migration liberalization. Taking medicine manufacturing for example, the 
spatial pattern of location quotient decreases from the eastern coastal areas to inland areas, 
and cluster in eastern provinces. Moran’s I test also provides evidence of spatial 
autocorrelation across provinces for medicine manufacturing location quotient (Analysis for 
spatial pattern of medicine manufacturing is presented in AppendixA 1.3). 
To fully illustrate the spatial spillover effects for all manufacturing industries, we use 
different approaches of spatial models to examine the spatial autocorrelation in the error 
term. We first use Moran test to detect the general spatial dependence in the OLS regression 
error term
8
. The result shows significant spatial autocorrelation exists in the error term (table 
11). However, the Moran test does not specify the model as spatial error model or spatial lag 
model
9
. We use Lagrange Multiplier test for both spatial error and spatial lag
10
. The Lagrange 
Multiplier test for spatial dependence and error are significant (p<2.076e-06 and p<1.308e-
06), indicating presence of both spatial error and spatial lag. However, when we apply robust 
Lagrange multiplier test for spatial error and spatial lag, they are no longer significant. The 
SARMA test is still significant. To sum up, both spatial lag and spatial error pattern might be 
present (table 12). Bear in mind, both Moran’s I test and LM tests apply to cross sectional 
data, and ignore the correlation between different years.  
                                                        
8 http://www.uni-kassel.de/~rkosfeld/lehre/spatial/SpatialEconometrics4b.pdf 
9 http://www.uni-kassel.de/~rkosfeld/lehre/spatial/SpatialEconometrics4b.pdf 
10 http://www.uni-kassel.de/~rkosfeld/lehre/spatial/SpatialEconometrics4b.pdf 
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As the data has panel structure of a cross sectional observations repeated over ten years for 
all 30 provinces, we apply a spatial panel model to capture both spatial dependence and time-
series dependence (Millo & Piras, 2012). We further examine the spatial autocorrelation 
using the spatial panel models, including spatial panel random effects generalized moments 
(GM-FE) model and Spatial panel fixed effects generalized moments (GM-RE) model. The 
weight matrix is (                 )  (                 ) , referred as     
matrix. 
We propose two models, spatial panel fixed effect model and spatial panel random effect 
model, to address the issue depending on the correlation of individual effects with other 
independent variables. Spatial panel fixed effect model assumes the individual effects are 
correlate with other explanatory variables, different individuals has specific intercept; while 
spatial panel random effect model assumes the individual effects are uncorrelated with other 
explanatory variables.  
First we examine the spatial panel random effect generalized moments model (table 13). The 
spatial coefficient for spatial autocorrelation in the unobservable individual effects is 0.1483. 
The coefficient for spatial lag of the dependent variable, location quotient, is significant at 
95% confidence level. Controlling for the spatial panel random effects, the independent 
variables are still has strong explaining power, TRPijt has significant positive effects on high-
tech industrial agglomeration. High-tech industries in TRP policy provinces will have a 
location quotient by 26%. By correcting the spatial autocorrelation in the error term using 
panel data structure, the positive effects of HEHS labor migration liberalization augmented. 
The positive effects also apply to scale economy and proximity. Interestingly, the vertical 
disintegration variable become significantly positive after controlling for spatial panel 
random effects, indicating the importance of intermediate suppliers in high-tech industrial 
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agglomeration process. However, we exclude year, province and year*province dummies in 
spatial panel random effect model. 
The spatial panel fixed effect generalized moments model shows consistent result as the 
spatial panel random effects model (table 13), with coefficient for spatial autoregressive 
disturbances to be 0.14827. It also shows significant spatial lag of dependent variable, at 99% 
confidence level. Controlling for the spatial panel fixed effects, all independent variables 
strongly explaining the increase in high-tech industrial location quotient. The significant 
positive coefficient for TRPijt implies that HEHS labor migration liberalization increases 
high-tech industrial concentration by 32%. Larger economic scale and being closer to 
customer markets also increase high-tech industrial agglomeration. Similar to spatial panel 
random effect model, high-tech industrial agglomeration is positively correlated with the 
intermediate suppliers.  
Finally, we apply the spatial Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) to test whether the random 
effects assumption is valid (table 14). If we reject the null hypothesis, then the spatial panel 
fixed effects generalized moments model is more appropriate to interpret. The spatial 
Hausman test statistics has p-value 0.0790, which reject the null hypothesis of random effects 
model at 90% confidence level. Therefore, we choose the panel fixed effects model as 
appropriate model. 
To conclude, we examine the spatial correlation in our estimation strategy and detect spatial 
dependence across provinces. The high-tech industry shows positive spatial spillover effects 
in the east coastal area. With the presence of spatial dependence, the OLS estimator is no 
longer efficient. Both the Moran test and Lagrange Multiplier test show strong evidence for 
spatial error and spatial lag pattern. Therefore, we apply different approaches of spatial 
models to deal with the spatial autocorrelation in the error term. We apply spatial panel 
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random effects model and spatial panel fixed effects model to consider inter-provincial 
spillover in location quotient. With control of spatial dependence in dependent variable and 
error term, the generalized moments estimation confirms the hypothesis 1 that HEHS labor 
migration liberalization promotes high-tech industrial concentration, with a significant 
positive coefficient of TRPijt. Also, larger economic scale and being proximate to consumer 
markets also fosters high-tech industrial concentration. The spatial panel GM models also 
find out the importance of intermediate suppliers to increase high-tech industrial 
concentration, with the coefficient for vertical disintegration to be significantly positive. 
However, the spatial analysis does not disprove OLS result as year, province and 
year*province dummies are excluded in spatial models. 
2.5   Conclusion  
This paper examines the effects of TRP policy on high-tech industrial agglomeration. The 
hypothesis 1 is confirmed that the TRP policy is positively correlated with agglomeration. 
High-tech industries respond to the availability to HEHS labor pools and co-locate in order to 
access talent. The positive impacts provide evidence to support selective migration policies in 
favor of agglomeration economies. The full impact of HEHS labor migration liberalization 
policies still needs closer scrutiny. 
Skilled labor migration will benefit individual migrant workers, firms that recruit a high 
portion of skilled labor, and both receiving and sending regions. First, human capital flows to 
places of high income. Migrant workers are willing to invest in education and be mobile to 
realize high returns to human capital investment (World Bank, 2009). Second, firms gain 
external economies through knowledge transmission and spillover effects. Skilled labor 
achieves higher productivity when agglomerated (World Bank, 2009). In addition, 
geographic concentrated firms compete with each other, accelerating innovation in the 
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industry. Third, receiving provinces will enhance comparative advantages with increasing 
innovation in firms and industries. Sending provinces maintain strong linkages with migrant 
workers (World Bank, 2009). Workers bring back finance remittance, information and 
techniques that could increase local firms knowledge accumulation and assist local economic 
growth (World Bank, 2009). 
Potential economic costs also emerge from selective migration. First, as more talented people 
agglomerate, the increasing supply of labor might cause wages to fall. Migrant workers bear 
the risk that expected economic returns might not outweigh the education investment (World 
Bank, 2009). Second, sending places face the problem of “brain-drain,” followed by 
economic loss (World Bank, 2009). With talented people flowing to economically developed 
places, income disparity arises across economically advanced and less advanced places. 
According to endogenous growth theory, human capital accumulation exerts positive external 
economies and provides sustainable sources of growth in leading economic regions, resulting 
in spatial disparity in growth rate (World Bank, 2009). 
The negative correlation between vertical disintegration is consistent with the technologic 
nature of high-tech industries, since highly vertically disintegrated industries will focus more 
on naturally produced inputs rather than HEHS labor inputs. Another traditional determinant 
for agglomeration, scale economy also plays an important role in high-tech industries’ 
location decisions. Firms are able to produce at minimum efficient scale and benefit from 
increasing returns. Being closer to population and markets is hypothesized to decrease the 
transportation costs, and lead to greater agglomeration. The estimation result confirms the 
positive correlation between proximity and high-tech industrial agglomeration. 
Finally there are some limitations to our analysis. First, the data are aggregated at the 
provincial and industrial level; firm level data, would be much preferred. There are also 
  35 
drawbacks to the use of the location quotient to measure industrial agglomeration.  On the 
one hand, it fails to determine whether or not a location with a concentration of employment 
corresponds to a particular industry (O’Donoghue and Gleave, 2004). On the other hand, the 
location quotient also utilizes ratios, so it does not employ the absolute size of local 
industry’s employment (O’Donoghue and Gleave, 2004). Thirdly, the actual HEHS labor 
numbers by industry within each province would make for a superior regressor when 
compared to the provincial TRP policy dummy that we use.  Using the actual HEHS data 
would allow the identification of specific industries that do or do not receive the treatment.  
Unfortunately those data are not accessible at this stage, so we must employ the TRP dummy. 
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2.7  Tables and Figures 
Table 2.1 Provincial Requirement for TRP Eligibility 
Province Year Eligibility 
Shanghai Jun-02 
Employees with college degree or above, possess 
professional skills 
Fujian Mar-02 
Mangers, engineers or technicians with master degree 
or above, possess management experience or project-
leader experience which are needed by employers 
Beijing Jun-03 
Employees with at least two years of management 
experience 
Jiangxi Aug-03 
Employees with college degree or above, possess 
intermediate level technician Certificate, or special 
technicians 
Guangdong Nov-03 
Employees possess management experience or 
technical skills which are needed by employers, with 
college degree or above, professional certificate, five 
years working experience or above 
Liaoning Nov-03 
Employees with professional certificate which is 
needed by employers, meets the shortages in high-tech 
enterprises 
Shandong Apr-04 
Employees under 40 years old, possess intermediate 
level professional certificate, meets the shortages for 
employers, and have signed contract with employers, 
technicians, possess special management experience 
or technical skills 
Hunan  May-04 
Specialists and technicians with college degree or 
above 
Zhejiang Sep-04 
Employees with college degree or above, specialists, 
technicians, possess management experience or 
project-leader experience which are needed by 
employers, invest over 500,000 RMB 
Shanxi Nov-04 
Employees with college degree and two years of 
management experience or project-leader experience 
Sichuan Feb-05 
Employees with college degree or above, possess 
professional skills 
Jilin Jun-05 
Specialists and technicians for high-tech industries, 
employees with patents, and research achievements, 
meets the shortages for employers 
Source: http://www.china.com.cn; http://chinaneast.xinhuanet.com; http://news.eastday.com; http://politics.people.com.cn; 
(Zhang, 2009; Fan et. al, 2009; Linda Wong and Huen Wai-Po, 1998)  
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Table 2.2 R&D Employment Share by Industry Types 
Year Manufacture of Medicine Food Processing Manufacture of Textile 
2001 3.69 2.26 0.45 
2002 7.15 1.64 0.12 
2003 10.08 2.04 0.14 
2004 10.07 2.15 0.07 
2005 9.61 1.33 0.05 
2006 1.78 0.33 0.45 
2007 1.81 0.38 0.42 
2008 1.89 0.34 0.48 
2009 2.11 0.38 0.52 
2010 1.96 0.38 0.51 
Group HEHS Intensive Semi-skill Intensive Low-skill Intensive 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook of Science and Technology, GB/T 4754-2002 
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Table 2.3 Classification on Manufacturing Industries  
Industry Category 
1 Processing of Food from Agricultural 
Products 
Semi-skill Intensive 
2 Manufacture of Foods Semi-skill Intensive 
3 Manufacture of Beverage Low-skill Intensive 
4 Manufacture of Tobacco Semi-skill Intensive 
5 Manufacture of Textile Low-skill Intensive 
6 Manufacture of Textile Wearing, Apparel, 
Footwear    and Caps 
Low-skill Intensive 
7 Manufacture of Leather, Fur, Feather and 
Its Products 
Low-skill Intensive 
8 Processing of Limbers, Manufacture of 
Wood, Bamboo, Rattan, Palm and Straw 
Products 
Semi-skill Intensive 
9 Manufacture of Furniture Low-skill Intensive 
10 Manufacture of Paper and Paper Products Low-skill Intensive 
11 Printing, Reproduction of Recording 
Media 
Low-skill Intensive 
12 Manufacture of Articles for Culture, 
Education and Sport Activities 
Low-skill Intensive 
13 Processing of Petroleum, Coking, 
Processing of Nuclear Fuel 
Low-skill Intensive 
14 Manufacture of Chemical Raw Material 
and Chemical Products 
HEHS Intensive 
15 Manufacture of Medicines HEHS Intensive 
16 Manufacture of Chemical Fiber Semi-skill Intensive 
17 Manufacture of Rubber Semi-skill Intensive 
18 Manufacture of Plastic Low-skill Intensive 
19 Manufacture of Non-metallic Mineral 
Products 
Low-skill Intensive 
20 Manufacture and Processing of Ferrous 
Metals 
Semi-skill Intensive 
21 Manufacture and processing of Non-
ferrous Metals 
Semi-skill Intensive 
22 Manufacture of Metal Products Low-skill Intensive 
23 Manufacture of General Purpose 
Machinery 
Semi-skill Intensive 
24 Manufacture of Special Purpose 
Machinery 
HEHS Intensive 
25 Manufacture of Transport Equipment Semi-skill Intensive 
26 Manufacture of Electrical Machinery and 
Equipment 
Semi-skill Intensive 
27 Manufacture of Communication 
Equipment, Computer and Other Electronic 
Equipment 
Semi-skill Intensive 
28 Manufacture of Measuring Instrument 
and Machinery for Cultural Activity and 
Office Work 
HEHS Intensive 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook of Science and Technology, GB/T 4754-2002 
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Table 2.4 Province Threshold and TRP Eligible Industries 
  2001-2004 2005-2010   
Province Education/Skill Limit 
TRP 
Eligible 
Industrie
s Education/Skill Limit 
TRP 
Eligible 
Industries 
Beijing 
College degree or above/ 
Intermediate technician 
certificate 4 
 
24 
Tianjin 
 
0 
 
0 
Hebei 
 
0 
 
0 
Shanxi 
 
0 
College degree or above/ 
2-year Management 
experience 24 
Inner Mongolia 
 
0 College degree or above 16 
Liaoning Professional Certificate 4 
 
24 
Jilin 
 
0 
Specialists and 
technicians for high-tech 
industries 20 
Heilongjiang 
 
0 
 
0 
Shanghai College degree or above 8 
 
24 
Jiangsu 
 
0 
 
0 
Zhejiang 
 
0 
College degree or above/ 
Technicians/ 
Management experience 24 
Anhui 
 
0 
 
0 
Fujian 
Master degree or above/ 
Management experience 8 
 
24 
Jiangxi 
College degree or above/ 
Intermediate technician 
Certificate 4 
 
24 
Shandong 
 
0 
Intermediate professional 
certificate/ Management 
experience 24 
Henan 
 
0 
 
0 
Hubei 
 
0 
 
0 
Hunan 
 
0 
College degree or above/ 
Specialists and 
technicians 24 
Guangdong 
College degree or above/ 
Management experience 4 
 
24 
Guangxi 
 
0 
 
0 
Hainan 
 
0 
 
0 
Chongqing 
 
0 
 
0 
Sichuan 
 
0 College degree or above 20 
Guizhou 
 
0 
 
0 
Yunnan 
 
0 
 
0 
Tibet 
 
0 
 
0 
Shaanxi 
 
0 College degree or above 16 
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Table 2.4 (cont.)  
  2001-2004 2005-2010   
Province Education/Skill Limit 
TRP 
Eligible 
Industrie
s Education/Skill Limit 
TRP 
Eligible 
Industries 
Gansu 
 
0 
 
0 
Qinghai 
 
0 
 
0 
Ningxia 
 
0 
 
0 
Xinjiang 
 
0 
 
0 
 
Source: author’s calculation of China Labor Statistical Yearbook, China Industry Economy Statistical Yearbook, China 
Statistical Yearbook of Science and Technology, GB/T 4754-2002 
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Table 2.5 Industrial Characteristics in Annual Survey Samples (2010) 
  
HEHS 
Intensive 
Semi-Skill 
Intensive 
Low-skill 
Intensive 
Location Quotient 0.92 0.90 0.80 
 
(0.66) (1.00) (1.11) 
Vertical Disintegration 0.80 0.80 0.80 
 
(0.20) (0.25) (0.15) 
Scale Economy 1.32 6.75 3.43 
 
(0.46) (2.87) (3.46) 
Proximity 16.32 27.35 13.64 
 
(2.03) (2.64) (1.57) 
R&D Employment Share 5% 4% 1% 
 
(0.16) (0.59) (0.49) 
R&D Share Relative to Average 163% 129% 50% 
 
(0.16) (0.59) (0.49) 
R&D Employment (entire nation)  62,943   70,508   14,182  
 
(0.33)  (1.19)  (0.74)  
Employment  46,742   47,098   33,484  
 
(1.00)  (1.97)  (1.87)  
Output (Billion) 71.82 109.37 66.60 
 
(1.79) (1.81) (1.54) 
Purchased Inputs (Billion) 58.53 94.04 54.96 
 
(1.84) (1.85) (1.59) 
Firm Number  512   523   616  
 
 (1.54)   (1.98)   (1.95)  
N 124 372 372 
Source: author’s calculation of China Labor Statistical Yearbook, China Industry Economy Statistical Yearbook 
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Table 2.6 Estimation Results 
 
Dummy Treatment Continuous Treatment 
 DDD DDD 
TRPdummyijt 0.0811
***
  
 
 
(0.000)  
TRPcontinuousijt  0.0184
***
 
  (0.001) 
   
Relative R&D Share 0.0074
**
  
 
(0.012)  
   
Vertical Disintegration -0.0262
*
 -0.0298
**
 
 
(0.052) (0.027) 
 
  
Scale Economy 0.0014
*
 0.0012 
 
(0.078) (0.151) 
 
  
Proximity 0.0064
***
 0.0064
***
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
   
Constant 0.6623
***
 0.6734
***
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Year*Province Yes Yes 
Observations 18231 18231 
Adjusted R
2
 0.190 0.189 
p-values in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 2.7 Odds Ratio Estimation Result 
 
Dummy Treatment Model Continuous Treatment Model 
TRPdummyijt 0.5921
***
  
 
 
(0.001)  
TRPcontinuousijt  0.1405
***
 
  (0.008) 
   
Relative R&D Share 0.0501
*
  
 
(0.079)  
   
Vertical 
Disintegration 
0.0037 -0.0435 
 
(0.987) (0.846) 
 
  
Scale Economy -0.0358
***
 -0.0383
***
 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
 
  
Proximity 0.0542
***
 0.0543
***
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
   
Constant 2.4578
***
 2.3555
***
 
 
(0.002) (0.003) 
Year*Province Yes Yes 
Observations 2742 2742 
Pseudo R2 0.180 0.1777 
p-values in parentheses 
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 2.8 ICE Imputation Estimation Results 
 
Dummy Treatment Model Continuous Treatment 
Model 
 DDD D-in-D DDD 
TRPdummyijt 0.0821
*
 0.0961
**
  
 
(0.059) (0.013)  
TRPcontinuousijt   0.0187 
 
  (0.177) 
Relative R&D Share 0.0072 0.0068  
 
(0.338) (0.354)  
    
Vertical Disintegration -0.0263 0.0068 -0.0298 
 
(0.493) (0.354) (0.438) 
  
  
Scale Economy 0.0015 -0.0080 0.0013 
 
(0.467) (0.823) (0.546) 
 
   
Proximity 0.0063
***
 0.0019 0.0063
***
 
 
(0.000) (0.332) (0.000) 
    
Constant 0.6651
***
 0.0056
***
 0.6760
***
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year*Province Yes No Yes 
Observations 3100 3100 3100 
p-values in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 2.9 MVN Imputation Estimation Results 
 
Dummy Treatment Model Continuous Treatment 
Model  DDD D-in-D DDD 
TRPdummyijt 0.0743
*
 0.0638  
 
 
(0.065) (0.161)  
    
TRPcontinuousijt   0.0188 
 
  (0.170) 
    
Relative R&D Share 0.0088 0.0094  
 
(0.219) (0.208)  
    
Vertical Disintegration -0.0378 -0.0342 -0.0387 
 
(0.283) (0.376) (0.316) 
 
   
Scale Economy -0.0009 -0.0013 -0.0015 
 
(0.670) (0.567) (0.490) 
 
   
Proximity 0.0091
***
 0.0095
***
 0.0096
***
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    
Constant 0.4597
***
 0.5811
***
 0.5949
***
 
 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) 
Year*Province Yes No Yes 
Observations 2731 2731 2731 
Adjusted R
2
 0.190 0.129 0.128 
p-values in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 2.10 Market Potential Estimation Model 
 Dummy 
Treatment 
Continuous 
Treatment 
TRPijt 0.1586
***
 0.0040 
 (0.001) (0.731) 
   
Vertical Disintegration -0.0052 -0.0062 
 (0.875) (0.849) 
 
   
Scale Economy 0.0087
***
 0.0084
***
 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Proximity 0.0061
***
 0.0060
***
 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Market Potential -0.0004 -0.0003 
 (0.119) (0.127) 
   
Constant 0.5511
***
 0.5752
***
 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Year Fixed Effects 
Province Fixed Effects 
Year*Province 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Observations 5630 5630 
Adjusted R2 0.161 0.159 
p-values in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 2.11 Moran’s I Test for OLS Residuals 
Moran I Statistics Expectation Variance 
3.6051e-02 -1.19064-04 5.7486e-05 
standard deviate = 4.7706 
p-value = 9.183e-07 
 
 
Table 2.12 Lagrange Multiplier Diagnostics for Spatial Dependence 
Statistics 
Degree of 
Freedom 
p-value 
LM error = 22.5232 df=1 p-value=2.076e-06 
LM lag = 23.4116 df=1 p-value=1.308e-06 
Robust LM error = 0.1831 df=1 p-value=0.6688 
Robust LM lag = 1.0715 df=1 p-value=0.3006 
Spatial Autoregressive Moving Average = 23.5947 df=2 p-value=7.525e-06 
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Table 2.13 Spatial Panel GM model 
 Random 
Effects Model 
Fixed Effects 
Model λ  0.2132* 0.3884*** 
 (0.0394) (0.0003) 
   
TRPijt 0.2673
***
 0.3247
***
 
 (2.219e-05) (1.973e-09) 
   
Vertical Disintegration 0.1166
***
 0.1624
***
 
 (3.765e-05) (5.529e-11) 
   
Scale Economy 0.0104
***
 0.0108
***
 
 (7.691e-09) (5.045e-13) 
   
Proximity 0.0054
***
 0.0056
***
 
 (2.2e-16) (2.2e-16) 
   
Constant 0.5760
***
  
 (7.291e-09)  
Spatial Coefficient   
ρ  0.1483 0.1483 
  
  1.4934 1.4935 
  
  6.6024  
p-values in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
Table 2.14 Hausman Test for Spatial Models 
Statistics Degree of freedom p-value 
Chisq = 9.8714 df = 5 p-value = 0.0790 
alternative hypothesis: Random Effect model inconsistent 
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Figure 2.1 Geographic Pattern for TRP Implementation 
  
Source: http://www.china.com.cn; http://chinaneast.xinhuanet.com; http://news.eastday.com; http://politics.people.com.cn; 
(Zhang, 2009) 
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Figure 2.2 Pre-treatment Differences in Policy Provinces and Non-policy Provinces 
 
Source: author’s calculation of China Labor Statistical Yearbook, China Industry Economy Statistical Yearbook 
Note: Policy provinces include: Fujian, Guangdong, Liaoning, Hunan, Shandong, Shanxi, Sichuan and Inner Mongol; Non-
policy provinces include: Gansu, Ningxia, Yunnan, Guizhou, Anhui, Hainan, Heilongjiang, Hebei, Henan, Jiangsu, Hubei, 
Chongqing, Guangxi. 
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Figure 2.3 Causality Test for TRP Policy and Agglomeration Relationship 
 
Source: Author’s calculation following Autor (2003), Angrist and Pischke (2008). China Labor Statistical Yearbook, China 
Industry Economy Statistical Yearbook, China Statistical Yearbook of Science and Technology, GB/T 4754-2002 
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CHAPTER 3   
AGGLOMERATION FORCES IN CHINESE FOOD PROCESSING INDUSTRY 
3.1   Introduction 
One of the most important trends in world food and agribusiness in recent decades has been 
the acceleration of technology-oriented innovation (Rademakers, 2012). The next generation 
of innovators needs to invest in science, technology, engineering and math as agriculture 
becomes increasingly sophisticated (Grant, 2012).  
Yet it has been widely recognized that the food and agriculture sector is a traditional 
profession, and agribusinesses may resist innovation and be slow to change (Shelman & 
Connolly, 2012). High technology industries recruit scientists, engineers, and technicians at 
at least twice the average for all industries (Hecker, 2005). For example, on average over the 
sample years (2001-2010), food processing employs high technology talent at 1.12 times the 
average of all industries (table 1). Thus there is an empirical question as to whether food and 
agribusiness is a high technology sector. One practical implication of being high versus low 
tech concerns a fierce competition for talent. Traditional high technology industries often 
outbid food and agribusiness, which is often thought of as labor intensive and employing only 
low or unskilled employees (Duerksen, 2012). It is worth studying whether the demand for 
highly skilled talent can cause firms in the agri-food sector to change their traditional location, 
rather than being closer raw material supplies. 
There is little empirical evidence on the response of food and agribusiness of skilled labor 
migration liberalization expansion policy. The hypothesis implies that access to a talent pool 
determines food and agribusiness firms’ location decisions. We assess this hypothesis by 
examining the effects of skilled labor liberalization expansion on food industrial 
concentration. The exogenous variation in the expansion is provided by the central 
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government designated TRP policy over the 2001-2010 period. The rest of this manuscript 
proceeds as follows: section II contains a literature review; section III presents the method 
and data; and section IV describes the results and conclusions. 
3.2   Literature Review 
On one hand, rapid development in technology and globalization drives contemporary food 
and agribusinesses to be more sophisticated and dynamic (Shelman & Connolly, 2012).  
Significant investment in science, technology, and engineering result from this development 
(Grant, 2012). Since knowledge could be generated and transmitted through local proximity, 
as food industry shifts into increasingly knowledge based industry, it tends to concentrate 
within one area (Audretsch, 1998). Knowledge could be transmitted through linkages of 
patent citation, skilled labor and traded goods (Feldman, 1999).  
On the other hand, the food industry often makes location decisions based on natural 
endowments, input abundance, increasing returns to scale, and low transport costs, not HEHS 
labor pools. The food industry exhibits increasing concentration in the food processing sector. 
Processors specializing in certain commodities face substantial sunk costs of investments and 
high transport costs of bulk agricultural products. As a consequence, food processing firms 
inclined to locate approximate to each other (Sexton & Lavoie, 2001). Increasing returns to 
scale are a significant force behind agglomeration in the food and beverage industry (Wang, 
2015). Decreasing transportation costs complement scale economies (Davis & Schluter, 2005) 
thus providing a driver to not agglomerate and thus not compete with like firms for access to 
transportation infrastructure or raw materials. Similarly, when transportation costs are low, 
proximity to high population centers is less relevant. Thus a processor’s proximity to a dense 
population may present less of a driving force for agglomeration in the larger food processing 
industry.  
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The purpose of this paper seeks to provide evidence that access to the talent pool is 
determinant for food industrial concentration. Our research studies the relationship between 
skilled labor migration liberalization and food processing industrial concentration, using the 
exogenous policy expansion-Talent Residency Permit (TRP)-that occurred in 2001 to 2010. 
The expansion occurred at different years in provinces across the country, providing “quasi-
randomization” which allowed assessment of effects of skilled labor migration liberalization 
on food firms’ location decisions (Gruber & Yelowitz, 1999, p. 2). 
3.3   Data 
This study uses two sets of China’s provincial 2-digit industrial statistics. One is China Labor 
Statistical Yearbook 2001-2010 and the other is China Industry Economy Statistical 
Yearbook 2001-2010. There is reasonable comparability between both data sets. Both of them 
are collected at the 2-digit industry   level   from   the Annual   Survey   conducted   by   
China’s   National   Bureau   of   Statistics   for   the period 2001-2010. The China Labor 
Statistical Yearbook does not include information like industry output, industry sales and 
operating costs, while the China Industry Economy Statistical Yearbook does include such 
information. The China Labor Statistical Yearbook collects employment for thirty 2-digit 
manufacturing industries for 31 provinces. We also use China’s national input-output table to 
examine the inter-industry linkages, which include 1997, 2002, 2005 and 2007 direct 
purchase coefficient in the input-output table for forty input-output sectors. 
Unfortunately, not all data exists for all industries across all provinces and years.  All 
dependent variables and treatment data exist, but control variables are missing for ten 
industries. The lack of data reduces the number of data points from 9,300 to 6,200. Of these 
6,200 data points, 14.8% were imputed due to missing values (AppendixA 1.4). 
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There are 20 industries after deleting industries with excessive missing data. In this paper, 
Food Processing Industry is defined as Processing of Food from Agricultural Products in 
GB/T 4754-2011 industry classification. Processing of Food from Agricultural Products 
includes grinding grain, feed processing, vegetable oil and sugar processing, slaughtering and 
meat processing, aquatic products processing, as well as vegetables, fruits and nuts and other 
food processing activities. We conduct a validation test on a known HEHS industry, 
Manufacture of Measuring Instrument and Machinery for Cultural Activity and Office Work, 
which is abbreviated as Manufacture of Measuring Instrument in this article. Following GB/T 
4754-2011 industrial classification, Manufacture of Measuring Instrument and Machinery for 
Cultural Activity and Office Work include General Instruments Manufacturing, Special 
Instruments Manufacturing, Chronometric Instruments Manufacturing, Optical instruments 
and Glasses Manufacturing, Culture, Office Machinery Manufacturing, Other Instruments 
Manufacturing and Repair. For comparative purposes we compare Average of All 
Manufacturing. The summary statistics for Food Processing, a typical HEHS industry and All 
Manufacturing is shown in table 2. 
The average Location Quotient for all manufacturing across the 20 industries is .89, which is 
slightly higher than for Measuring Instruments and slightly lower than for Food Processing. 
Measuring Instruments experiences greater variation across the provinces in terms of its LQ, 
as seen by the higher coefficient of variation. Food Processing is more disintegrated than the 
average manufacturing industry, but less disintegrated than Measuring Instruments. Average 
firm size is comparable between Food Processing and Measuring Instruments, but both are 
significantly smaller than the average size firm for All Manufacturing. Food Processing’s 
supplier (rural) orientation comes through again, as the proximity variable for 2010 is 42% 
less than Instrument Manufacturing and 29% less than for All Manufacturing. Food 
Processing has an R&D intensity significantly less than Measuring Instruments and less than 
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half of the average of All Manufacturing industries. Thus Food Processing would apparently 
have less demand for HEHS employees, especially as a percentage of their labor force. Food 
Processing is a relatively large industry, but maintains a lower level of labor intensity 
(number of employees/output) compared with the average manufacturing industry or 
Measuring Instruments.  
In sum, the model includes three control variables, Vertical Disintegration, Scale Economy, 
and Proximity. There are also two unobserved variables, year and province effects. Finally, 
there is the TRP implementation, which is the one treatment variable. The three control 
variables and one treatment variable have significant but minor levels of correlation (table 3).  
3.4  Method and Result 
3.4.1   Propensity Score Analysis 
A propensity score method is applied to identify the treatment effect of skilled labor policy 
on food processing industrial agglomeration. The assumption is the common trend on food 
processing industrial agglomeration in treatment group and control group. The idea behind 
propensity score matching is to find the potential control group that possesses similar 
characteristics as the treatment group. In our case, treatment is provinces that receive the 
skilled labor policy; while the control group is non-policy provinces. Then we compare the 
outcome in food processing industrial agglomeration between the treatment-control 
provinces; the difference reveals the average treatment effect of the skilled labor 
liberalization policy on food processing industrial agglomeration
11
.  
Unobserved characteristics might result in different responses to treatment in policy 
provinces or the potential treatment effect that would occur in non-policy provinces, therefore 
                                                        
11 http://bayes.cs.ucla.edu/BOOK-09/ch11-3-5-final.pdf 
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we follow Xie, Brand, & Jann (2012) and calculate the heterogeneous treatment effect. Let 
the Y
1
 and Y
0
 denote the potential outcome in policy and non-policy provinces. The average 
treatment effect (ATE) is defined as       (     ) . Let T=1 indicates the policy 
provinces, T=0 indicates the non-policy provinces.      (     )  (  
 (   )) (     |   )   (   ) (     |   )   (     |   )   (  
 )  (     |   )   (     |   )  
Where  (     |   )   (     |   ) measures the, i.e. the difference in potential 
treatment effect for treatment group and control group. Ignoring the difference would cause 
estimation bias, i.e. heterogeneous treatment bias (Xie et al., 2012). 
Heterogeneous treatment effect propensity score matching model is adopted to deal with the 
possible systematic heterogeneous characteristics between policy and non-policy provinces 
and heterogeneous treatment effect. This means individual provinces might respond 
differently toward policy
12
. 
Following Xie, Brand, & Jann (2012), we first use a profit regression model to estimate the 
probability of each province to receive policy treatment, the propensity score, given 
employment and squared R&D employment as observed pre-treatment covariates. We then 
divide the propensity score into different strata to ensure that the propensity score and 
covariates’ characteristics are similar among policy provinces and non-policy provinces 
within the same strata; this is also referred to as the balance property of propensity score. 
Finally, Food Processing’s propensity score is divided into three blocks, Instrument 
Manufacturing’s propensity score is divided into three blocks and All Manufacturing’s 
propensity score is divided into thirteen blocks. This ensures the mean propensity score and 
covariates are not different for treated provinces and control provinces in each block. The 
                                                        
12 http://www.psc.isr.umich.edu/research/project-detail/34476 
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underlying assumption behind the strata-specific treatment effect is that there is no pre-
treatment and heterogeneous treatment effect bias between strata (Xie et al., 2012).  
In the third step, we estimate the heterogeneous treatment effects (HTE) as a function of a 
propensity score. We use both stratification and non-parametric smoothing function to 
estimate the HTE effects. The stratification multilevel model assumes there is no pre-
treatment and heterogeneous treatment effect bias between strata and imposes a “higher level 
regression” (Xie et al., 2012, p. 9) across strata to further examine the effects of policy on 
industrial location quotient (figure 1). The regression estimates the linear trend across the 
strata to detect the pattern of heterogeneous treatment effect across the propensity strata. The 
first plot refers to Food Processing, the second plot refers to Instrument Manufacturing and 
the third plot refers to All Manufacturing. Instrument Manufacturing shows a positive linear 
trend at 0.1 significant level; All Manufacturing shows a positive linear trend at 0.01 
significant level. The positive linear trend is not significant for Food Processing. A positive 
linear trend indicates that provinces receiving policy treatment presents a higher level of 
location quotient in All manufacturing. 
Apart from using an across-strata trend to examine heterogeneous treatment effects, a non-
parametric smoothing function uses across-individual trend to detect HTE. The logic behind 
the non-parametric smoothing function is to construct individual matches between treated 
cases and untreated cases, and then compare the difference across treated and untreated cases 
(Xie et al., 2012). We use local polynomial smoothing regression with a 95% confidence 
interval to initially detect the pattern of heterogeneous treatment effect. A positive treatment 
effect is present for All Manufacturing and Food Processing, while the positive trend is more 
flat for Food Processing. The pattern is not monotonic for Instrument Manufacturing 
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(figure2). Being exposed to skilled labor pool does attract All Manufacturing and Food 
Processing firms to co-locate. 
In sum, the overall pattern of the heterogeneous treatment effect of non-parametric smoothing 
curves in Food Processing, Instrument Manufacturing, and All Manufacturing are similar 
with linear trends in stratification estimation result. This result suggests the location quotient 
in Food Processing, Instrument Manufacturing and All Manufacturing is expected to increase 
as the probability of receiving policy treatment increases. The result indicates that when we 
control for the heterogeneous treatment errors, the average treatment effect of policy 
treatment presents positive trends for Food Processing, Instrument Manufacturing and All 
Manufacturing. The result provides evidence that being closer to a talent pool will have 
positive, yet minor impacts on Food Processing. Here we still need to be cautious to interpret 
the result because the systematic heterogeneity in policy effects might vary across provinces 
that receive policy treatment (Xie et al., 2012). 
3.5   Robustness Check 
In order to assess the validity of the hypothesis that access to a talent pool has a positive 
association with industrial concentration, we use the fixed effect model to test the importance 
of the skilled labor policy for 28 manufacturing industries, ranging from low-tech to high-
tech, to obtain intuitive evidence of the effects of skilled labor migration liberalization on 
industrial concentration across industries (figure 3). For the coefficients for policy variable, 
refer to table 4. The fixed effects model applied in each industry is as follows: 
            (              )   (                )                                                                                                                               
where j indexes the province and t indexes the year.       is the dependent variable for 
industrial agglomeration, measured as location quotient. The term      is a vector of variables 
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controlling for the traditional determinants for industrial agglomeration; including Vertical 
Disintegration, Scale Economy, and Proximity to markets.     is a full set of province 
dummies, and    is a full set of time dummies.  
Figure 3 shows the industries respond to the skilled labor expansion, including low-tech 
category industries of Manufacture of Textile, Manufacture of Non-metallic Mineral Products 
and Manufacture and Processing of Ferrous Metals, median-tech and high-tech category 
industries of Processing of Food from Agricultural Products, Manufacture of Instruments, 
Manufacture of Communication and Computer Equipment and Manufacture of Medicines 
(industry category according to industry’s R&D share relative to manufacturing average in 
2010).   
Skilled labor policy has a positive effect on Food Processing, at 0.01 significant level. The 
result confirms Rademakers (2012) and Duerksen (2012) that Food Processing firms co-
locate in order to access talent pool. Food and agribusiness is increasingly technical, and 
compete against other high technology industries for talent. 
3.5.1  Inter-industrial Linkages 
We are concerned that in-migration of high-skilled/high-educated workers stimulate high-
tech firms to concentrate; the agglomeration of high-tech industries increases the demand for 
food and catering products, consequently boosting the food processing firms to concentrate 
and result in food processing industrial agglomeration. We use China’s national input-output 
table to examine the backward and forward linkages between food processing industries and 
other industries. Table 5 shows that different sectors from national economic activities 
purchase food processing products directly. In 2005, for example, out of total food processing 
sales in inter-industry intermediate transaction, 35.09% goes to Food, Beverages and 
  64 
Tobacco Production, which rank No. 1 in directly purchased food processing products. The 
two other largest intermediate demands for food processing products come from Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fishery Production (26.43%) and Hotels and Catering Services (24.13%). 
However, high-tech industries including General Purpose and Special Purpose Machinery, 
Transportation Equipment Industry, Manufacture of Electrical Machinery and Equipment, 
Computers and Telecommunications Equipment, Information Transmission, Computer 
Services and Software Industry purchase less than 0.5% of total food processing intermediate 
sales. 
To understand the full picture of intermediate goods flow for different sectors’ food 
processing products, we plot the range of direct input coefficients through 1997 and 2007 for 
forty input-output sectors. The forty input-output sectors record information from industries’ 
classifications for national economic activities, ranging from agriculture, to manufacturing, to 
service industries. The direct input coefficient is the percentage use of raw materials, here 
specifically designating food processing products, to produce one unit of production in each 
input-output sector
13
. The direct input coefficient reflects the importance of food processing 
products as intermediate inputs for other sectors’ production. The direct input coefficient for 
food processing products is less than 0.1 on average across 40 sectors, with only three sectors 
demanding substantial food processing goods as intermediate inputs. The three top sectors are 
Food, Beverages and Tobacco Production; Agriculture; Forestry and Fishery Production; and 
Hotels and Catering Industry (figure 4).  
In sum, the inter-industry linkages between food processing and technology intensive 
industries is pretty weak. It rules out the possibility that skilled labor pool causes technology 
intensive industries’ agglomeration, thus boosts Food Processing industry through inter-
                                                        
13 http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/io/2005/pdf/ioe05005.pdf 
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industry linkages. The result disproves that high-tech industries demand large amount of 
Food Processing products as intermediate inputs. The inter-industry linkage analysis provides 
evidence that Food Processing industrial agglomeration results from high-skilled/high-
educated labor pooling, and not because that high-tech industrial agglomeration drives related 
industries (Food Processing) to agglomerate. 
We take a closer look at the Food Processing industry’s contributions to the economy. A 
common method is to identify the key sectors for economic growth using the Hirschman-
Rasmussen index (table 6). The Hirschman-Rasmussen index classifies key sectors according 
to backward linkages and forward linkages. Backward linkage measures a sector’s demand 
pulling effects. With a backward linkage index greater than one, a unit increase of final 
consumption in a particular sector would generate a greater multiplier effects on economic 
activities than the average multiplier effects from a final consumption unit increase in any 
other sectors (Resosudarmo & Nurdianto, 2007). Forward linkage measures a sector’s supply 
pushing effects. In a similar fashion, with forward linkage index greater than one, a unit 
increase of production in a particular sector would generate greater multiplier effects on 
economic activities than the average multiplier effects from a unit increase of production in 
any other sectors (Resosudarmo & Nurdianto, 2007). 
According to Hirschman (1958) and Rasmussen (1958), the Hirschman-Rasmussen index is a 
composite of a backward linkage index and a forward linkage index. Backward linkage index 
is measured as    
∑    
 
 
 ⁄
∑ ∑    
 
 
 
 
  
⁄
 and forward linkage index is measured as    
∑    
 
 
 
⁄
∑ ∑    
 
 
 
 
  
⁄
. 
Here aij is an element from a Leontief inverse matrix, indicating the multiplier effect in each 
  66 
sector due to the unit increase in final demand of a particular sector
14
. n is the total number of 
intermediate sectors in input output table. ∑    
 
  means to sum the Leontief inverse matrix 
over columns. ∑    
 
  means to sum the Leontief inverse matrix over rows. When a sector 
with Bj and Fi are greater than 1, the sector is classified as key sector in the economy; when 
Fi is greater than 1 while Bj is less than 1, the sector is categorized as a “forward-oriented 
sector”; when Bj is greater than 1 while Fi is less than 1, the sector is categorized as a 
“backward-oriented sector”; when neither of Bj nor Fi is greater than 1, the sector is grouped 
as a “non-key sector” (Resosudarmo & Nurdianto, 2007, p. 8). Table 6 shows that food 
processing falls in the non-key sector category, indicating the trivial impacts of the food 
processing industry on inter-industrial relationships, with low demand pulling effects and 
supply pushing effects. The evidence supports that observed food processing industrial 
concentration is due to high-skilled/high-educated labor pooling effects, rather than strong 
inter-industrial linkages. 
3.5.2  Demand Driven Agglomeration 
We are concerned that the economic growth stimulates consumption, leading to higher 
demand for food processing products through consumers’ increasing consumption. The 
demand effect might confound the policy treatment effect, which is the effect from skilled 
labor in-migration on industrial concentration. We use GDP, population density and province 
income as demand variables to examine the impact of economic demand on Food Processing, 
Instrument Manufacturing and All Manufacturing industrial concentration. First we look at 
the correlation between population density, province income, GDP and other explanatory 
variables. We use Person’s correlation matrix to analyze the relationship between the 
variables. The sign of correlation indicates the positive or negative relationship between 
                                                        
14 http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/industry-and-services/data/stan-input-output/inverse-matrix-coefficients-domestic_data-
00577-en;jsessionid=6nfiiir4pf376.epsilon?isPartOf=/content/datacollection/stan-in-out-data-en 
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variables and the absolute value of correlation indicates the strength of correlation
15
. Because 
there is not a strict threshold to determine the correlation as strong and weak, we adopted 
commonly used (Dancey & John, 2004) classifications for correlation strength: 0.1-0.3 
implies a weak correlation, 0.4-0.6 implies a moderate correlation, 0.7-0.9 implies a strong 
correlation
16. From the Pearson’s correlation matrix we could see that there is a moderate 
association of policy with GDP and province income, showing that higher GDP and higher 
income are associated with more policy treatment. At the same time, there is a moderate 
association between GDP and province income, with Pearson’s correlation of 0.477 and 
population density with province income, with correlation of 0.390 (table 7).  
As there are moderate associations between GDP and province income, population density 
and province income, as well as these three demand variables with policy treatment, we 
include policy, GDP, population density and province income as independent variables in a 
regression model (table 8).  
Among the three demand variables that might affect industrial concentration independent of 
policy treatment effect, GDP does present significant, though minor, positive effects on 
industrial concentration in Instrument Manufacturing and All Manufacturing. Population 
density shows significant positive effects on a typical high tech industry, Instrument 
Manufacturing, and significant negative effects on Food Processing and All Manufacturing. 
However, these effects are relatively minor in magnitude.  
The result from demand driven regressions are supported from consumption information in 
an input output table. Final consumption, which is composited of household consumption, 
purchases a large portion of food processing gross output. In 1997, 37.17% of food 
                                                        
15 http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/gerstman/StatPrimer/correlation.pdf 
16 http://www.strath.ac.uk/aer/materials/4dataanalysisineducationalresearch/unit4/correlationsdirectionandstrength/ 
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processing gross output is used for intermediate input use, while 55.07% is used for final 
consumption (table 9).  
All final consumption goes into household consumption. In both 1997 and 2002, about half 
of food processing products go into household consumption (figure 5), though figure 5 does 
show an increase in intermediate use for food processing products, reflecting the importance 
of food processing as raw materials for other sectors’ production. 
3.6  Study Limitations 
Fan et al. (2009) raise an important finding that industry specific labor permits may be issued 
in a particular region. Thus the HEHS policy implementation may not be uniform within a 
province. For example: software, biotech and digital manufacturing in coastal cities were 
more easily granted permits because of the shortage of HEHS workers (Fan et al, 2009). This 
finding challenges our model’s assumption of the TRP policy implementation’s exogeneity at 
the provincial level for Food Processing. The actual HEHS quota numbers by industry within 
each province would make a regressor superior to the provincial TRP policy dummy that we 
use. Using the actual HEHS quota data would allow the identification of specific industries 
that do or do not receive the treatment. Unfortunately, those data do not exist. Therefore, we 
must employ a more general TRP dummy. Secondly, there are two drawbacks to the use of 
the location quotient to measure industrial agglomeration. For one, it fails to determine 
whether or not a location with a concentration of employment corresponds to a particular 
industry (O’Donoghue & Gleave, 2004). The location quotient also utilizes ratios that do not 
convey the absolute size of a local industry’s employment (O’Donoghue & Gleave, 2004). 
However, since the data for this study is aggregated at provincial and industrial levels, we are 
not able to address the above questions, and compromise to use a more general TRP dummy 
variable.  
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3.8  Tables and Figures 
Table 3.1 R&D Intensity on Manufacturing Industries in year 2001-2010 
Industry 
R&D 
Intensity 
R&D 
Intensity 
Relative to 
Average 
Category 
1 Processing of Food from Agricultural 
Products 
0.45% 112.48% Medium-
Tech 2 Manufacture of Food 0.54% 87.91% Low-tech 
3 Manufacture of Beverage 0.76% 37.98% Low-tech 
4 Manufacture of Tobacco 0.93% 66.27% Low-tech 
5 Manufacture of Textile 0.55% 32.08% Low-tech 
6 Manufacture of Apparel and Footwear 0.15% 11.52% Low-tech 
7 Manufacture of Leather, Fur, and Feather 
Products 
0.19% 14.31% Low-tech 
8 Processing of Manufacture of Wood and Fiber 
Products 
0.30% 104.78% 
Medium-
Tech 
9 Manufacture of Furniture 0.24% 15.50% Low-tech 
10 Manufacture of Paper and Paper Products 0.63% 42.54% Low-tech 
11 Printing, Reproduction of Recording Media 0.40% 27.92% Low-tech 
12 Manufacture of Articles for Culture, 
Education and Sport 
0.40% 20.41% Low-tech 
13 Processing of Petroleum, Coking, Processing 
of Nuclear Fuel 
0.83% 39.29% Low-tech 
14 Manufacture of Chemical Raw Material and 
Products 
1.51% 181.41% 
Medium-
Tech 
15 Manufacture of Medicines 2.29% 501.46% High-tech 
16 Manufacture of Chemical Fiber 2.03% 156.83% Medium-
Tech 17 Manufacture of Rubber 1.12% 53.64% Low-tech 
18 Manufacture of Plastic 0.83% 52.59% Low-tech 
19 Manufacture of Non-metallic Mineral 
Products 
0.60% 42.32% Low-tech 
20 Manufacture and Processing of Ferrous 
Metals 
1.42% 70.58% Low-tech 
21 Manufacture and processing of Non-ferrous 
Metals 
1.43% 114.93% 
Medium-
Tech 
22 Manufacture of Metal Products 0.86% 42.42% Low-tech 
23 Manufacture of General Purpose Machinery 1.82% 104.84% Medium-
Tech 24 Manufacture of Special Purpose Machinery 1.92% 227.38% Medium-
Tech 25 Manufacture of Transport Equipment 2.34% 126.88% Medium-
Tech 26 Manufacture of Electrical Machinery and 
Equipment 
2.35% 119.83% 
Medium-
Tech 
27 Manufacture of Communication and 
Computer Equipment 
3.22% 196.41% 
Medium-
Tech 
28 Manufacture of Measuring Instruments 1.77% 195.51% Medium-
Tech Note: Low-tech = <99% of average; Medium-Tech = 100-299% of the average; High-tech = >300% of the average 
Source: authors’ calculation of China Labor Statistical Yearbook, China Industry Economy Statistical Yearbook 
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Table 3.2 Industry Characteristics (2010) 
Variable Food 
Processing 
Instruments 
Manufacturing 
(HEHS) 
Average of All 
Manufacturing 
Location Quotient 0.92 0.77 0.89 
 
(0.75) (1.09) (0.93) 
Vertical Disintegration 0.86 0.96 0.80 
 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.21) 
Scale Economy 1.22 0.91 4.59 
 
(0.41) (0.46) (3.29) 
Proximity to Population 14.58 25.04 20.55 
 
(1.71) (2.20) (2.16) 
R&D Intensity 0.01 0.05 0.03 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.59) 
R&D Intensity relative to average 0.95 4.03 2.88 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.59) 
Number of Employees/Province 39,961 22,923 49,183 
 
(1.22) (1.53) (1.70) 
Number of R&D employees 13,362 32,578 57,824 
   
(1.16) 
Output* ($USD Billion)/Province 112.67 21.33 87.74 
 
(1.27) (1.87) (1.82) 
Number of Firms/Province 826 194 552 
 
(1.09) (1.50) (1.91) 
Industry Sale** ($USD Billion)/Province 111.83 17.37 87.2 
 
(1.26) (1.93) (1.83) 
Total Profits ($USD Billion)/Province 7.56 1.79 6.15 
  (1.26) (1.66) (1.74) 
* Output reflects the production of products  ** Industry sales reflects the sales of products 
Source: authors’ calculation of China Labor Statistical Yearbook, China Industry Economy Statistical Yearbook 
Note:  coefficient variation (standard deviation/mean) in parenthesis 
 
 
Table 3.3 Correlations between Variables 
  
Location 
Quotient Policy 
Vertical 
Disintegration 
Scale 
Economy 
Proximity 
      Location Quotient 1 
    
Policy 0.0659
***
 1 
   
Vertical 
Disintegration 
-0.0040 0.0399
***
 1 
  
Scale Economy 0.0944
***
 0.0869
***
 -0.0515
***
 1 
 
Proximity 0.337
***
 0.2160
***
 0.0186 0.1380
***
 1 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Source: authors’ calculation of China Labor Statistical Yearbook, China Industry Economy Statistical Yearbo
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Table 3.4 Industries with Significant Policy coefficient 
 Food  Textile Measuring Non-
metallic 
Communication Processing Special 
Purpose 
Manufacture 
of 
 Processing Manu. Instruments Mineral Equipment Ferrous 
Metals 
Machinery Medicine 
policy 0.1348
***
 0.1956
***
 0.2225
***
 0.0817
***
 -0.1009
***
 -0.0691
**
 0.0747
*
 -0.0469 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.009) (0.035) (0.073) (0.105) 
         
Vertical 
Disintegration 
-0.3313
*
 -0.0124 -0.0016 -0.0894 -0.0091 -0.4963
***
 0.0229 0.0782 
 (0.099) (0.940) (0.992) (0.644) (0.949) (0.002) (0.843) (0.447) 
         
Scale Economy 0.0040 0.0146 0.2879
***
 0.0928 0.0440
***
 0.0293
***
 0.3016
***
 0.1745
***
 
 (0.951) (0.833) (0.003) (0.285) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
         
Proximity -0.0045
**
 -0.0017 -0.0135
**
 0.0012 0.0013
***
 0.0016
***
 0.0040
*
 0.0072
***
 
 (0.045) (0.356) (0.014) (0.595) (0.000) (0.003) (0.056) (0.006) 
         
Constant 0.8871
***
 0.2704
*
 1.4096
***
 0.6188
***
 0.6686
***
 0.7255
***
 0.6295
***
 0.5885
***
 
 (0.000) (0.093) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 279 276 264 277 262 268 271 277 
Adjusted R2 0.947 0.905 0.925 0.819 0.975 0.951 0.872 0.916 
p-values in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3.5 Top 10 Sectors’ Direct Purchase of Food Processing Products 
Source: 1997, 2002, 2005 and 2007 China’s national input-output table and authors’ calculation 
Input-Output Sector 2005
Food, Beverages and Tobacco Products 35.09%
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery Products 26.43%
Hotels and Catering Services 24.13%
Clothing and Wearing Apparel, and Leather and Leather Products 4.09%
Wholesale and Retail Trade Services 1.50%
Transportation, and Supporting and Auxiliary Transport Services 0.64%
Construction Services 0.28%
Financial Intermediation, Insurance and Auxiliary Services except Compulsory Social Security 
Services 
0.01%
Products of Mining and Quarrying 0.01%
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Table 3.6 Hirschman-Rasmussen defied Sector Classification 
Sector Category 
Textile Industry Key Sector 
Paper printing and Educational Goods Key Sector 
Chemical Industry  Key Sector 
Metal smelting and Rolling processing Industry Key Sector 
Mechanical Industry Key Sector 
Transportation equipment Manufacturing Key Sector 
Electrical machinery and equipment Industry Key Sector 
Electronic and Telecommunication equipment Industry Key Sector 
Oil processing and coking Industry Forward-oriented Sector 
Mining and Quarrying Industry Forward-oriented Sector 
Petroleum and Natural gas Exploitation Industry Forward-oriented Sector 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery Production Forward-oriented Sector 
Business Forward-oriented Sector 
Instruments, Culture and Office supplies Industry Backward-oriented Sector 
Metal products Industry Backward-oriented Sector 
Mechanical equipment repair Industry Backward-oriented Sector 
Wood processing and Furniture manufacturing Industry Backward-oriented Sector 
Nonmetallic mineral manufacturing Industry Backward-oriented Sector 
Source: 1997, 2002, 2005 and 2007 China’s national input-output table and authors’ calculation 
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Table 3.7 Correlation between Variables 
 Policy GDP Populatio
n Density 
Province 
Income 
Vertical 
Disintegra
tion 
Scale 
Economy 
Proximity 
Policy 1       
GDP 0.4460
***
 1      
Population 
Density 
0.2680
***
 0.2880
***
 1     
Province 
Income 
0.3410
***
 0.4770
***
 0.3900
***
 1    
Vertical 
Disintegrat
ion 
0.0370
**
 0.1160
***
 0.0260
*
 -0.0154 1   
Scale 
Economy 
0.0878
***
 0.0885
***
 0.1380
***
 0.0425
***
 -0.0507
***
 1  
Proximity 0.1400
***
 0.1380
***
 0.5640
***
 0.2470
***
 0.0405
**
 0.0707
***
 1 
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 3.8 Demand Variables Estimation Results  
Panel A Food Processing Instrument 
Manufacturing 
All 
Manufacturing 
Policy 0.1269
***
 0.1719
***
 0.0445 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.248) 
    
GDP 0.0000 0.0000
***
 0.0000
**
 
 (0.170) (0.003) (0.033) 
    
Population Density -0.0003
**
 0.0005
**
 -0.0004
**
 
 (0.035) (0.026) (0.017) 
    
Vertical Disintegration -0.3078 -0.0154 -0.0080 
 (0.122) (0.926) (0.806) 
    
Scale Economy -0.0013 0.2254
**
 0.0085
***
 
 (0.985) (0.019) (0.000) 
    
Proximity -0.0037 -0.0053 0.0061
***
 
 (0.116) (0.379) (0.000) 
    
Constant 1.1313
***
 0.7347
**
 0.7203
***
 
 (0.000) (0.029) (0.000) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Province Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 279 264 5630 
Adjusted R
2
 0.948 0.929 0.160 
p-values in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 3.8 (cont.)  
Panel B Food Processing Instrument 
Manufacturing 
All Manufacturing 
Policy 0.1220
***
 0.1870
***
 0.0389 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.312) 
    
GDP 0.0000 0.0000
***
 0.0000
**
 
 (0.210) (0.003) (0.050) 
    
Vertical Disintegration -0.3273 -0.0100 -0.0088 
 (0.103) (0.952) (0.788) 
    
Scale Economy -0.0121 0.2206
**
 0.0084
***
 
 (0.855) (0.023) (0.000) 
    
Proximity -0.0036 -0.0113
**
 0.0061
***
 
 (0.127) (0.038) (0.000) 
    
Constant 0.8556
***
 1.3435
***
 0.3799
***
 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Province Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 279 264 5630 
Adjusted R
2
 0.947 0.927 0.159 
p-values in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Figure 3.1 Stratification-Multilevel Model Across Strata Trend 
 
Note: Red dot indicates treatment effect within each propensity score strata, the interval indicates 90% Confidence Interval, 
the green line indicate linear trend across strata. 
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Figure 3.2 Local Polynomial Smoothing Curve for HTE by Industry 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation on China Labor Statistical Yearbook, China Industry Economy Statistical Yearbook 
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Figure 3.3 Industries with Significant Policy coefficient 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation on China Labor Statistical Yearbook, China Industry Economy Statistical Yearbook 
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Figure 3.4 Direct Input Coefficient Range from 1997 – 2007 across 40 Sectors 
 
Source: 1997, 2002, 2005 and 2007 China’s national input-output table and authors’ calculation 
Note: Food Processing and Tobacco Manufacturing rank No. 1 in demand for food processing products; Catering industry is 
the second largest industry demanding food processing products 
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Figure 3.5 Use of Food Processing Gross Output in 2002 
 
Source: 1997, 2002, 2005 and 2007 China’s national input-output table and authors’ calculation 
  
42.35% 
49.54% 
8.11% 
Total Input Use
Total Consumption
Other
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CHAPTER 4   
DOES KNOWLEDGE DRIVE FIRMS TO AGGLOMERATE? 
4.1   Introduction 
Industrial agglomeration emerges as firms attain advantages by being located closer to one 
another (Fujita & Thisse, 2002). In particular, firms attain advantages associated with 
knowledge, whereby neighboring firms achieve innovation through quickly disseminated 
information (Glaeser, Kallal, Scheinkman, & Shleifer, 1992). The profit margins derived 
from innovative outputs attract firms to enter and agglomerate locally (Baptista & Swann, 
1998). 
A large labor pool facilitates industrial agglomeration in two ways. First, firms tend to co-
locate in order to share inputs, including specialized labor (Glaeser et al., 1992). A thick labor 
market increases probability of matches between employees and employers. The second way 
a large labor pool facilitates industrial agglomeration is in how firms attain advantages 
associated with knowledge, whereby neighboring firms achieve innovation through quickly 
disseminated information (Glaeser et al., 1992). These effects are well known as “labor 
pooling effect,” and “knowledge spillover effect” respectively. 
Though literature makes effort to estimate labor as a driver for agglomeration (Heiko & 
Konrad, 2008; Hewings & Oosterhaven, 2014; Overman & Puga, 2010), it has not 
successfully modeled the knowledge effect. The main reason for this difficulty is that tacit 
knowledge cannot be directly measured (Masahisa Fujita & Krugman, 2003). Literature 
debates the pathway through which the knowledge effect arises. Several works argue that 
knowledge is derived from knowledge exchange that occurs among agents who possess 
horizontally differentiated types of knowledge (Berliant and Fujita, 2008; Berliant et al., 
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2006; Glaeser et al., 1992). In contrast, Marshall (1879) states that knowledge is generated 
among people being neighborhood through same skill interaction. 
The objective of this paper is to model and test the knowledge effect through which a skilled 
labor pool increases agglomeration. The previous chapter (Wang, 2015) shows that access to 
a skilled labor pool increases high-tech industrial agglomeration. Wang (2015) uses a set of 
natural experiment and finds that high-tech industries respond to a skilled labor migration 
liberalization policy. This chapter aims to disentangle the knowledge effect imposed on a 
skilled labor pool that increases high-tech industrial agglomeration. This chapter also shows 
that the policy treatment effect is heterogeneous across sectors within high-tech industries. 
The driving force for the heterogeneous treatment effect is knowledge. Controlling for labor 
pooling effect and other externalities of agglomeration, this chapter identifies the knowledge 
effect that skilled labor pool causes high-tech firms to agglomerate. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1 provides an overview of related 
literature. Section 2 develops a theoretical model. Section 3 provides an empirical tests using 
China’s skilled labor policy. Section 4 constructs a robustness check. Section 5 concludes the 
results. 
4.2   Literature Review 
Firms tend to congregate spatially where tacit knowledge is easily disseminated (David & 
Rosenbloom, 1990; Giuliani, 2005). Knowledge exhibits increasing returns in the production 
function, enticing firms to agglomerate locally (Combes, Duranton, & Overman, 2005; 
Romer, 1986). However, it is difficult to measure tacit knowledge, since there is no paper 
trail to measure and track the invisible knowledge (Krugman, 1991). A solid micro-model of 
knowledge spillovers is also rare (Fujita & Krugman, 2003). 
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Agent heterogeneity, defined as horizontal knowledge differentiation, plays an important role 
in knowledge creation (Berliant & Fujita, 2008, 2009; Berliant et al., 2006). The efficacy of 
knowledge creation on agglomeration is referred as knowledge efficacy. Some scholars argue 
that knowledge efficacy is maximized in a heterogeneous sector (Berliant & Fujita, 2008, 
2009, 2011; Berliant et al., 2006): when knowledge types are too alike, agents (such as 
individuals or firms) are reluctant to exchange knowledge as little new knowledge is created; 
when the knowledge types are too different, no knowledge exchange exists because of a lack 
of common ground (Berliant & Fujita, 2008; Berliant et al., 2006). Other works state 
knowledge is generated through same-skill trade (Arrow, 1962b; Glaeser et al., 1992; 
Marshall, 1879; Romer, 1986). Knowledge efficacy exhibits increasing returns (Arrow, 
1962b; Romer, 1986), and leads to geographical proximity of specialized industries (Glaeser 
et al., 1992).  
Theories debate whether heterogeneity alone leads to maximal knowledge efficacy. Evidence 
has been adduced on both sides of the debate (Arrow, 1962a; Berliant & Fujita, 2008, 2011; 
Glaeser et al., 1992; Helsley & Strange, 2004; Romer, 1986). Berliant et al. (2006) find 
knowledge efficacy is only maximized at optimal heterogeneity level; and decreases as 
heterogeneity deviates from the optimal level (becomes too low or too high). Berliant and 
Fujita (2008) find an initial state of homogeneity and heterogeneity both lead to most 
productive new knowledge creation, while the size of a close interaction to generate maximal 
new knowledge is smaller for homogeneous agents than for heterogeneous agents. Jacobs 
(1969) also finds knowledge is easily disseminated among geographically proximate 
diversified industries. However, while Berlin and Fujita (2008, 2011) and Berlin, Reed, et al. 
(2006) regard knowledge as arising from interpersonal externalities, Jacobs (1969) considers 
knowledge emerges from inter-industrial information transmission. There is abundant 
literature supporting knowledge creation in a homogeneity sector. Homogeneity plays an 
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important role in knowledge externality as it reduces the free rider problem and increases 
knowledge exchange efficacy; agents with a large degree of homogeneity reach most 
productive knowledge production (Berliant & Fujita, 2008). The within industry (across 
firms) knowledge spillover effect is well documented as the MAR (Marshall-Arrow-Romer) 
mode, which suggests spatial proximity facilitates knowledge transmission through imitation 
and skilled workers’ high job-hopping rate (Glaeser et al., 1992). Firms concentrate in 
geographical proximity to benefit from same skill trade, where industry-specific skilled 
collaboration generates new knowledge (Keeble & Wilkinson, 1999; Romer, 1986). 
Apart from knowledge, other externalities also explain industrial agglomeration. Access to a 
large labor pool might entice firms to agglomerate not because of knowledge, but rather 
because of division of labor. Puga (2009) argued that the probability of matching increased in 
a larger labor pool. Apart from knowledge and specialized labor, agglomeration also emerges 
from other sources. Agglomerative externalities from shared inputs also explain 
agglomeration (Glaeser et al., 1992). Abundant natural resources provide firms with natural 
cost advantages, enticing firms to co-locate (Ellison & Glaeser, 1999). Increasing return to 
production scale results in scale economy, which is another important determinant for 
agglomeration (Krugman & Melitz, 2012). Being closer to customer markets reduces 
transport costs, which also entices firms to agglomerate (Ellison & Glaeser, 1999). Access to 
intermediate suppliers is another source for agglomeration (Lu & Tao, 2009). 
I found several limitations in the current literature: it does not establish the link among 
heterogeneity, new knowledge and industrial agglomeration; it does not provide an empirical 
test for the relationship of heterogeneity with industrial agglomeration; it does not specify 
measurement for heterogeneity capturing horizontally differentiated knowledge types.  
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This paper models and tests the relationship between heterogeneity and knowledge efficacy. 
This chapter asks if heterogeneity alone leads to maximal knowledge efficacy. It proposes 
two hypotheses. 1: The relationship between heterogeneity and knowledge efficacy is an 
inverse U shape. And 2: The relationship between heterogeneity and knowledge efficacy is 
quadratic. The results disapprove the statement that heterogeneity leads to the maximal 
knowledge efficacy, providing evidence that there exist multiple maximum and homogeneity 
leads to maximal knowledge efficacy. 
With control of other externalities, this paper provides additional evidence that knowledge is 
an agglomeration mechanism operating through skilled labor pooling. The study improves 
previous literature by identifying knowledge effect through heterogeneous treatment effect of 
skilled labor policy on high-tech sectors’ agglomeration. Understanding the interaction 
between skilled labor mobility, heterogeneity and agglomeration provides a profound 
foundation so as to investigate the full impacts of labor markets on agglomeration, such as 
labor pooling, human capital externality and innovation. The current study provides a more 
nuanced understanding of the impacts that skilled labor reallocation might have on China’s 
economic geography. 
4.3   Theoretical Model 
The theoretical model investigates the relationship between heterogeneity and knowledge 
efficacy. To illustrate, it attempts to answer the question: how do horizontal knowledge 
differences affect the knowledge spillover effect? 
We introduce the concepts from Berliant and Fujita (2008), and Berliant, Reed, et al. (2006) 
to set up the model. We use   
 ( )        to denote if a person i knows idea k at time t. By 
the time t, the person obtains the knowledge domain   ( )  ∑   
 ( )    . In this model, we 
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consider the case that two agents exchange and create new knowledge. The common 
knowledge from agent i and agent j is    
 ( )  where    
 ( )     
 ( )  ∑   
 ( )    
 ( )     
The special knowledge specific to agent i is    
 ( )    ( )     
 ( ), likewise the special 
knowledge specific to agent j is    
 ( ). The sum of knowledge owned by agent i and j is as 
follows: 
   ( )     
 ( )     
 ( )     
 ( ) 
where    
 ( )  denotes common knowledge and    
 ( ) and    
 ( ) denote differentiated 
knowledge specific to agent i and j respectively. Divide both sides of the equation by    ( ), 
and denote 
   
 ( )
   ( )
 as   
 ( ), 
   
 ( )
   ( )
 as   
 ( ), 
   
 ( )
   ( )
 as   
 ( ), and the above equation becomes: 
     
 ( )     
 ( )     
 ( ) 
   
 ( ) is the share of common knowledge,   
 ( ) is the share of special knowledge owned 
by agent i,   
 ( ) is the share of special knowledge owned by agent j. We will later use 
   
 ( ),   
 ( )  and   
 ( ) to calculate heterogeneity and new knowledge growth rate. 
Now let’s introduce the knowledge exchange function which generates new knowledge. Let 
          represent whether two agents i and j exchange with each other.       means 
agent i and j don’t exchange knowledge; while       means agent i and j exchange 
knowledge. Noticeably, Berliant and Fujita (2008) assume that       when the domain of 
knowledge for the two agents are too alike or too diverse, i.e.       when   
 ( )    or 
   
 ( )   . This paper relaxes this assumption and only assumes       when the domain 
of knowledge for the two agents is too diverse, i.e.       when    
 ( )     We allow 
agents to exchange knowledge when they possess mere common knowledge, since 
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homogeneity might also maximize knowledge exchange efficacy as homogeneity reduces 
moral hazard problems and increases knowledge exchange efficiency (Berliant & Fujita, 
2008). 
When agent i and j don’t exchange with each other, they produce new knowledge by 
themselves, so the new knowledge increases proportionally to their own knowledge:    ( )  
    ( )       (Berliant & Fujita, 2008, p. 9). When agent i and j exchange with each 
other, they produce new knowledge from learning and interacting with each other, so the new 
knowledge increases proportionally to their common knowledge and special knowledge 
specific to their own:    ( )       
 ( )     
 ( )     
 ( )           (Berliant & Fujita, 
2008, p. 9). The increased new knowledge is the sum of the agent’s own accumulated new 
knowledge and common new knowledge the agent i created with another agent j:    ( )  
∑        ( )
 
            ( )  ∑        
 
   ( ) . When we assume zero new 
knowledge at an initial stage, we could simplify    ( ) as    ,   ( ) as   . 
In the two agents case, we follow Berliant and Fujita (2008) and assume symmetry in the 
initial stage and no knowledge transmission. Therefore,    
     
  
     
 
 
 (Berliant & 
Fujita, 2008, p. 13). Take agent i for example, the growth rate of new knowledge owned by 
agent i is as follows: 
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Let  (   
 ) denote new knowledge growth rate as a function of   
 , and the new knowledge 
growth rate is a cubic function of share of common knowledge. 
   
  
|(     )   (   
 )   
[   
 (
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)
 
  (
 
    
)   
When two agents exchange knowledge, we could also calculate the level of common 
knowledge share at which the new knowledge creation is maximized.  
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 (   
 ) is maximized at   
    and   
  
 
 
. Accordingly, the specific knowledge share is 
   
    and    
  
 
 
. Heterogeneity is measured as the sum of special knowledge share 
specific to each agent i and j. Heterogeneity aims to capture the horizontally differentiated 
knowledge types between two agents. We denote heterogeneity as        
     
    
   
 . Therefore, the growth rate of new knowledge generated from knowledge exchange could 
be expressed as function of    . Since  (   
 ) is maximized at   
    and   
  
 
 
, in other 
words,  (   ) is maximized at       and     
 
 
. By loosing the constraint imposed by 
Berliant and Fujita (2008), we find that both homogeneity and optimal heterogneity 
maximize new knowledge growth rate. We can develop our hypotheses from here (figure 1). 
Berliant et al. (2006) state that little new knowledge is created among agents too alike or too 
different. New knowledge growth rate is maximized only at optimal knowledge distance 
s
*
>0, where 
  (   )
    
|    . The first hypothesis is developed as follows:  
   : The relationship between heterogeneity and knowledge efficacy is an inverse U shape. 
   : The relationship between heterogeneity and knowledge efficacy is not an inverse U 
shape. 
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We found that the new knowledge growth rate is maximized at optimal heterogeneity level, 
 
 
, 
i.e. 
  (   )
    
|
    
 
 
  . In addition, we found that new knowledge growth rate is also 
maximized when heterogeneity is equal to 0, i.e. homogeneity could also achieve most 
productive new knowledge, i.e. 
  (   )
    
|       . The result confirms the theory that 
homogeneity leads to the most productive knowledge creation (Berliant & Fujita, 2008). The 
second hypothesis is developed as follows: 
   : The relationship between heterogeneity and knowledge efficacy is quadratic. 
   : The relationship between heterogeneity and knowledge efficacy is cubic. 
We could link the agent level heterogeneity with sector level heterogeneity to demonstrate 
the probability of knowledge exchange. Specialized industry would have a smaller 
knowledge type span and expect to be more homogeneous, while diversified industry would 
have a larger knowledge type span and expect to be more heterogeneous. Therefore, we use a 
measure of specialization versus diversification to proxy homogeneity versus heterogeneity. 
To sum up, the theoretical model demonstrates the relationship between heterogeneity and 
knowledge efficacy. In the following section, we want to empirically test whether only 
heterogeneity leads to maximal knowledge efficacy. 
4.4   Empirical Model 
Since knowledge efficacy is not directly measureable, we propose an indirect test to identify 
knowledge efficacy as heterogeneous treatment effect that skilled labor policy affects high-
tech industrial agglomeration. The logic here is that the skilled labor policy affects industrial 
agglomeration through two channels: labor pooling and knowledge effect. Controlling for 
labor pooling, we can identify the knowledge effect. The previous chapter (Wang, 2015) 
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shows that TRP policy increases agglomeration in policy provinces’ high-tech industries. 
This chapter shows that the treatment effect is not identical across sectors within a treatment 
group (high-tech industries). By sorting high-tech sectors according to their heterogeneity 
level, we found a non-linear treatment effect of skilled labor policy on high-tech industrial 
agglomeration. The heterogeneous treatment effect attempts to capture the knowledge effect.  
Supportive of this concept, we found policy causes a difference in industrial agglomeration 
between treatment group (high-tech industries in policy provinces) and control group (low-
tech industries). There are two effects through which the policy causes the difference. First, 
the high-tech industries would agglomerate more because they can hire specialized skilled 
workers from an increased skilled labor pool size. We construct a Labor Pooling variable to 
control for this thick market effect. Second, high-tech industries agglomerate more because 
they benefit from knowledge spillover effect, where tacit knowledge is easily dissimilated so 
as to generate innovation. Knowledge effect is of our primary interest. The treatment effect is 
not identical for all sectors within high-tech industries. We use the treatment effect as proxy 
for knowledge efficacy. Specifically, we are interested in the relationship between sector’s 
heterogeneity level and knowledge efficacy. The base model is constructed as follows: 
                                    
                               
          
                              
     is the Ellison Glaeser index as measure for industrial agglomeration  for four digit 
industry i at province j in year t.          is measured as high-tech firms in policy provinces. 
        measures four digit industry’s heterogeneity in   province j.     takes care of 
province-specific time trend.    is a set of province fixed effects.    is a set of year fixed 
effects.      is a vector of control variables for traditional determinants for industrial 
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agglomeration, including labor pooling, input sharing, scale economy and proximity to 
markets (Ellison & Glaeser, 1999; Krugman & Venables, 1996).  
Berliant, Reed, et al. (2006) argue that knowledge exchange efficacy maximizes at optimal 
heterogeneity level, and decreases as heterogeneity deviates from the optimal level. 
Therefore, a skilled labor pool will maximize the treatment effect in a particular optimal 
heterogeneity sector, and the positive effect decreases as sectors deviate from optimal 
heterogeneity level. Theory posits there is a hump shape relationship between knowledge 
efficacy and heterogeneity. In hypothesis 1, we aim to test a presence of inverse U shape 
relationship between treatment effect and heterogeneity level. Hypothesis 1 in empirical test 
corresponds to hypothesis 1 in theoretical model that the relationship between heterogeneity 
and knowledge efficacy is an inverse U shape. A quadratic approximation could be 
misleading by concluding an inverse U shape while the true relationship is concave and 
monotone (Lind & Mehlum, 2007). Let the polynomial function of heterogeneity to be F. In 
order to test an inverse U shape relationship, we follow Lind and Mehlum (2007) and test the 
slope of the relationship in a certain interval (           ): whether the slope is positive at 
low value      , and decreasing at high value      . Usually, the invertal is chosen as 
(               ). The assumption imposed in the method is that at most one extreme point 
exists in the interval (Lind & Mehlum, 2007). The test combined null hypothesis is as 
follows: 
      
 |                
 |            
      
 |               
 |            
By rejecting the null, it shows there does not exists an inverse U shape relationship between 
heterogeneity and treatment effect, providing evidence that optimal heterogeneity does not 
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maximize the knowledge efficacy. However, we still cannot conclude that only heterogeneity 
leads to maximal knowledge efficacy. The assumption is the polynomial function of 
heterogeneity allows at most one extreme point. A question arises here: does there exist only 
one maximal point? We proceed to hypothesis 2 to empirically test whether the relationship 
between heterogeneity and knowledge efficacy is quadratic. Rejecting the null means we 
cannot rule out more than one maximal efficacy points exist. A cubic term is added in the 
regression to allow for a more flexible non-linear relationship.  
We construct a nested model to test hypothesis 2. The null model is base quadratic 
polynomial; the alternative model (extended model) is a cubic polynomial. The hypothesis 2 
basically asks whether the extended model predicts better than the null model. Following is 
the alternative model (extended model): 
                                    
                               
          
                                   
          
           
       
The null model is nested within the extended model
17
. We want to determine whether the 
extended model contributes substantial additional information and improves the predictive 
power
18
. The hypothesis 1 can be expressed as follows: 
                                     
Rejecting     means that at least one additional term,        
           or        
  adds 
information for the response
19
, and hence improves the fit of the model
20
. The null hypothesis 
                                                        
17 http://www.public.iastate.edu/~alicia/stat328/Multiple%20regression%20-%20nested%20models.pdf 
18 http://www.public.iastate.edu/~alicia/stat328/Multiple%20regression%20-%20nested%20models.pdf 
19 http://www.public.iastate.edu/~alicia/stat328/Multiple%20regression%20-%20nested%20models.pdf 
20 http://www.biostat.jhsph.edu/~ejohnson/regression/Testing%20of%20Multiple%20Regression%20Coefficients.pdf 
  97 
   ,            indicating presence of at most one maximal point. Rejecting the null 
hypothesis means the possibility of multiple maximal points.  
We first apply an F-test to test the above multiple regression models. An F-test compares the 
SSE for the null model and the SSE for the extended model
21
. The test statistics is such that 
, where      is the sum of squared error for the null model,      
is the sum of squared error for the extended model, p is the number of additional parameters 
(2 in our case), k is the number of parameters in the null model (9 in our case), n is the 
number of observations. We reject the    when         (     ) . We then apply a 
likelihood ratio test to compare the fit of the null model and extended model. We aim to 
identify those parameters estimates that maximize the probability of the data
22
. The log 
likelihood ratio test is such that     (           ). We reject the    when the chi-
squared statistics are greater than the critical value
23
. We also conduct Wald test to test 
whether           in standard errors. 
4.5   Data 
The data comes from three sources: (1) Annual Survey of Industrial Firms, which includes 
572,000 firms, covering 600 different four-digit industries from 1998 to 2007; (2) China 
Industry Economy Statistical Yearbook, which includes information about industry output, 
industry sales and operating costs from 2001-2010; (3) China Labor Statistical Yearbook 
reports 2-digit manufacturing industries employment at provincial and industrial level from 
2001-2010. 
                                                        
21 http://www.public.iastate.edu/~alicia/stat328/Multiple%20regression%20-%20nested%20models.pdf 
22 http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/mult_pkg/faq/general/nested_tests.htm 
23 http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/mult_pkg/faq/general/nested_tests.htm 
F =
(SSEn- SSEe) / p
SSEe / [n- (k + p+1)]
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The Annual Survey of Industrial Firms (ASIF) is the main database used in this paper. The 
ASIF data includes all state owned firms and non-state owned firms above five million RMB 
sales. From 1998-2007, the database includes about 330,000 firms, covering 600 different 
four-digit industries. The number of manufacturing employment ranges from 7,600 to 9,700 
from 2001 to 2007. Different from China Industry Economy Statistical Yearbook, which 
aggregates data at the provincial level and two-digit industry level, ASIF contains firm level 
data at the city level and the four-digit industry level. ASIF data include variables such as 
number of employees, export density, new products, output, purchased inputs and sales etc. 
4.5.1   Measure of Agglomeration 
The agglomeration measurement indices evolved to incorporate both political boundaries and 
distance. Ellison & Glaeser (1999) measure agglomeration as firms choose to locate in 
discrete units by following prior firm’s location rather than by randomness.  
The EG-index is derived by:   
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  This index has several advantages. It provides 
unbiased estimation and accounts for firm behavior. We calculate the EG statistics for 4-digit 
SIC manufacturing industries at province level. EG index is equal to zero means that the 
industry chooses a random location. EG index is greater than zero indicates that the 
industry’s localization is above pure randomness (Cassey & Smith, 2014). Though the 
interpretation of EG value as industry’s concentration level is not obvious, Ellison and 
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Glaeser (1997) provide cut-offs for very concentrated (greater than 0.05), somewhat 
concentrated (between 0.02 and 0.05), and not very concentrated (less than 0.02). We look at 
480 4-digit SIC manufacturing sectors at province level, and find that 103 sectors are very 
concentrated (table 1). Most high-tech industries are in the very concentrated category, such 
as Manufacture of Medicines (0.0522), Manufacture of Electrical Machinery and Equipment 
Manufacture of Communication Equipment (0.0795), Computer and Other Electronic 
Equipment (0.1993), Manufacture of Measuring Instrument and Machinery for Cultural 
Activity and Office Work (0.1842).  
Ellison, Glaeser and Kerr (2007) improved the EG index and constructed an EG index of 
coagglomeration, which measures the conglomeration of a group of industries, not a 
particular industry. The EG index of coagglomeration focuses on a group of industries, not a 
particular industry. It measures the excess concentration of the industrial group in geography 
compared with those same agglomerated industries locating independently in different places 
(Ellison et al., 2007). EG index of coagglomeration captures the agglomeration dynamics 
within industrial groups (Ellison et al., 2007; Kominers, 2008). Following Ellison, Glaeser 
and Kerr (2007), we calculate EG index of coagglomeration as follows:  
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where     denotes each city’s share of industrial group I employment in the province, 
m=1,2,…,M.    denotes each industry’s share of industrial group I employment in the 
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    denotes the special Gini index for industries I group.    denotes the 
Herfindahl index for industries I group, calculated as    ∑   
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Table 2 shows the summary statistics of 2-digit industrial EG index for coagglomeration. The 
geographical pattern of 2-digit industries might not be the same as 4-digit sectors. For 
example, the average EG index for 4-digit sectors in Manufacture of Communication 
Equipment, Computer and Other Electronic Equipment is 0.1993, while the EG-
coagglomeration index is 0.0810, lower than EG index. The reason for the difference could 
be that concentrated sectors locate in different provinces. In contrast, when concentrated 4-
digit sectors also localize in the same province, the EG-coagglomeration index tend to be 
higher than average EG index for 4-digit sectors. For example, Manufacture of Furniture EG-
coagglomeration index is 0.1777; higher than average EG index 0.1170 (table 2).  
4.5.2  Measure of Heterogeneity 
We aim to measure heterogeneity to capture horizontally differentiated knowledge. Previous 
studies have been far less abundant in empirically measuring horizontal skill heterogeneity, 
but rather providing theoretical models (Berliant & Fujita, 2009; Chang & Kim, 2006, 2007; 
Masahisa Fujita & Weber, 2004). Literature "never directly measure knowledge 
heterogeneity" (Rodan & Galunic, 2004, p. 545), but rather provide indirect indicators for 
knowledge heterogeneity. A promising indicator for heterogeneity is constructed by 
Branstetter (2001). Branstetter (2001) first calculates "technology space" to measure the 
distribution of R&D across various technological fields. The distance between technology 
space between two firms is measured as the uncentered correlation coefficient of the 
technology spaces of the two firms. The distance captures the heterogeneity concept in our 
analysis. However, to calculate the distance index requires detailed information of patent and 
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technology classification (Branstetter, 2001), which we lack in our data. Another problem 
with the technology space is that it may confound the vertical heterogeneity, in other words, 
high-skill versus low-skill, with the horizontal heterogeneity. Ensley, Carland, and Carland 
(1998) measured skill heterogeneity with indicators such as: major in college, highest degree 
and current functional position. Rosenthal and Strange (2001) provided three proxies for 
workers with industry-specific skills: net productivity, which equal to the value of shipments 
less the value of purchased inputs, divided by the number of workers in the industry; ratio of 
management workers divided by sum of management workers and production workers; 
percentage of workers with Doctorates, Master’s degrees and Bachelor’s Degrees. Due to 
data restriction, we cannot retrieve the information of management workers, and the workers’ 
education levels.  
Several scholars use a production specialization index to measure Marshall externalities 
derived from complementary industries (Carbonara & Tavassoli, 2013; Malerba, Mancusi, & 
Montobbio, 2013; Paci & Usai, 1999). The production specialization index is calculated as 
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, where     indicates employment in z
th 
firm in a particular industry in region j. 
This indicator aims to capture the knowledge that arises within specialized sectors. The 
problem with the specialization index is that it confounds firms’ concentration with 
knowledge specialization. Besides, the number of employment is not equivalent to the 
number of knowledge types. Feldman and Audretsch (1999); Paci and Usai (1999) propose a 
measure of production diversity index, which is calculated as 
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the average employment for sector s, i denotes firm and j denotes province. The Gini and 
Theil index measures the level of diversity, which captures the Jacob’s externality. The 
limitation in SP, Gini and Theil indicators is that they separate homogeneous knowledge 
(specialization) and heterogeneous knowledge (diversity) as two variables, yet do not provide 
a unique variable that can both capture knowledge specialization and knowledge diversity. 
We calculate heterogeneity analogous to Overman and Puga’s (2010), and demonstrate 
heterogeneity as production shock volatility (Overman & Puga, 2010, p. 137). We use the 
number of new products to proxy the number of firm’s knowledge types. The idiosyncratic 
shock is measured as the absolute difference between the percentage change in the firm’s 
new products and the percentage change in the sector’s new product, calculated as 
|                                       |. By average the variable across firms in 
the sector, we can compare the idiosyncratic volatility to production shock for one sector and 
another. The intuition behind the index is as follows. Let’s imagine an extreme case: a 
homogeneous sector possesses exactly the same type of specialized knowledge. When there 
is a production shock, each firm in the sector will adjust its knowledge matrix exactly the 
same way. The absolute difference between the percentage change in each firm’s new 
products and the percentage change in the sector’s new products is zero. When we average 
the variable across firms in the sector, the sector’s idiosyncratic volatility is zero. A 
heterogeneous sector possesses multiple types of specialized knowledge. An individual firm 
might possess a knowledge matrix quite different from another firm. When there is a 
production shock, one firm will increase its new products substantially while other firms do 
not change their new products. The absolute difference between the percentage change in 
each firm’s new products and the percentage change in the sector’s new product is relatively 
high. When averaging across firms, the index is relatively high for the sector, indicating the 
sector’s idiosyncratic volatility is greater than zero. In sum, a higher value of the index 
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indicates that the sector is a more heterogeneous knowledge matrix and therefore is more 
volatile to production shock. 
4.5.3   Other Externalities 
Apart from knowledge, there are many other externalities that explain the emergence of 
agglomeration, including the externalities from specialized labor and shared inputs (Glaeser 
et al., 1992). We construct a labor pooling variable and an input sharing variable to control 
for these agglomerative externalities. 
Rosenthal and Strange (2001) calculate net productivity per worker, which equals the value 
of shipments less the value of purchased inputs, divided by the number of employment. One 
problem with the net productivity per worker is that the index does not disentangle the labor 
pooling effect from knowledge effects. Better matching might arise from the fact that skilled 
workers search information more efficiently than unskilled workers, rather than from the fact 
that there is a large, thick labor pool (Overman & Puga, 2010).  
Overman and Puga (2010) measures labor pooling as fluctuation in employment of individual 
firm relative to sector average. It has the same formula to construct heterogeneity, yet it is 
calcualted with employment rather than new products. The intuition behind it is that sectors 
who are more volatile to idiosyncratic shock are more likely to benefit from labor pooling.  
A high level of the measurement means that the sector is more volatile to idiosyncratic shock. 
The idiosyncratic shock is calculated as the difference between the percentage change in the 
firm’s employment and the percentage change in the sector’s employment (Overman & Puga, 
2010). By averaging across firms in the sector, we calculate idiosyncratic votality of the 
sector as a proxy for labor pooling. Another potential index for labor pooling is empoyment 
number, which captures the size effect of the labor market. 
  104 
Another potential index for labor pooling is empoyment number, which captures the size 
effect of the labor market. 
A dense network of input suppliers provides abundant intermediate inputs (Helsley & 
Strange, 2001), affecting firms’ location decisions. Rosenthal and Strange (2001) use 
manufactured inputs per dollar of shipment to proxy input sharing. It is calculated as the ratio 
of the purchased inputs to the value of shipments. We use the sales data to proxy shipment 
data and calculate the input-sharing index as follows: 
                
               
     
 
The signs for labor pooling and input sharing agglomerative externalities are indeterminate. 
On one hand, access to specialized intermediate inputs and labor reduces production costs, 
resulting in economies of scale external to firms, which encourage firms to cluster. On the 
other hand, however, a dense network of labor and firms leads to higher crowding and higher 
rents, resulting negative externalities, which discourage firms from clustering. Agglomerative 
externalities facilitate industrial agglomeration when the positive externalities outweigh 
negative externalities (Jofre-Monseny, Marín-López, & Viladecans-Marsal, 2011; Kolko, 
2007). 
Table 3 reports the summary statistics of variables, describing the characteristics of 
manufacturing sectors. Heterogeneity averages 0.149, with standard error of mean 0.022. 
Heterogeneity level is relatively low, indicating that sectors on average exhibit homogeneous 
characteristics. The 75
th
 percentile heterogeneity is 0.03, which is smaller than the mean, 
showing negative skewness of the heterogeneity variable. The low level of Labor Pooling 
averages 0.022, indicating that sectors are not very volatile to idiosyncratic employment 
shock. Input sharing averages around 0.8, indicating a large share of inputs in sales. The data 
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exhibit heterogeneity in a firm’s employment number, sales, input and firm number. We need 
to be aware of industrial-specific characteristics in explaining the agglomeration economies. 
The correlation matrices examine the relationships among variables (table 4). The 
coefficients measure the linear relationship between pairs of variables. Noticeably, there is no 
statistically significant correlation between Heterogeneity and Labor Pooling, Heterogeneity 
and Input Sharing, or Heterogeneity and Proximity (table 4). Labor Pooling does not 
significantly correlate with Input Sharing and Proximity. Input Sharing is significantly 
positively correlated with Proximity (0.125), Input Sharing has significant negative 
correlation with Scale Economy (-0.055). A sector that highly depends on intermediate 
suppliers tends to be more specialized in production function, and therefore has low levels of 
scale economy. Proximity has significant positive correlation with Scale Economy (0.316), 
indicating a bigger size sector tends to locate closer to a customer market. However the 
magnitude of correlation is minor (<0.4) and will not bring the concern of colinearity. 
Meanwhile, it’s necessary to show that the effect of heterogeneity on agglomeration is 
independent of skill intensity (which is calculated as the ratio of R&D employment in the 
industry). That is to say, we would rule out the possibility that the high-tech sectors’ 
agglomeration increases merely because of high skill intensity, not because of heterogeneity. 
The correlation between skill intensity and        ,        
 , and        
  is significant, yet the 
magnitude is close to zero (table 5). Therefore, we rule out the concern that effect from 
heterogeneity on agglomeration is confounded with skill intensity. 
4.6  Result 
The result shows in table 6. The first column corresponds to base model. Hypothesis 1 tests 
whether the relationship between heterogeneity and knowledge efficacy is an inverse U 
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shape. We choose an interval of heterogeneity value                  , and test to see that 
the slope of the polynomial function of heterogeneity is positive at the start and negative at 
the end of the interval. This operates on two assumptions: 1) the polynomial function of 
heterogeneity is chosen so that there is at most one extreme point; 2) the first derivative of a 
polynomial function with regard to heterogeneity is monotone in the test interval (Lind & 
Mehlum, 2007). Rejecting the null means the relationship between heterogeneity and 
knowledge efficacy is not an inverse U shape. The U-test result shows slope at lower bound 
is negative and at upper bound is positive. T-test is 3.51, P>|t|=0.0002. The     is rejected at 
0.01 level. Therefore, we cannot conclude that heterogeneity leads to maximal knowledge 
efficacy.  
Now we proceed to hypothesis 2. The second column corresponds to extended model. We are 
interested in which model gives better prediction. F-test compares the sum of squared error 
(SSE) of both null model and extended model and determines model selection. F-test is 4.24, 
Pr(F>4.24)=0.0144. We reject null model and choose extended model at 0.05 significant 
level. The result shows the cubic heterogeneity term is significantly associated with 
agglomeration, after adjusting other determinants for agglomeration, revealing the possibility 
of more than one maximal point in agglomeration. We will then discuss in detail whether 
heterogeneity or homogeneity leads to maximal agglomeration. Then we apply likelihood 
ratio test to compare the two models. LR test calculates chi-square statistics equal to 8.55, 
Pr(Chi
2
 >8.55)=0.0139. Therefore, we decide to reject the null model and conclude that cubic 
term of heterogeneity contributes additional information in explaining agglomeration
24
. Wald 
test specifically tests          showing the same result as F-test. The result is consistent 
with previous tests. Noticeably, the magnitude of cubic term is pretty small, leading to a plot 
close to negative linear. Nonetheless, the result at least disproves that only heterogeneity 
                                                        
24 http://www.biostat.jhsph.edu/~ejohnson/regression/Testing%20of%20Multiple%20Regression%20Coefficients.pdf 
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leads to maximal knowledge efficacy. The result provides evidence supporting Berliant & 
Fujita (2008), Marshall (1879), Romer (1986) that homogeneity leads to maximal knowledge 
efficacy, so forth leads to maximal agglomeration. The result from testing hypothesis 1 and 
hypothesis 2 disprove that only heterogeneity leads to maximal knowledge efficacy: 1) 
homogeneity leads to maximal knowledge efficacy; 2) there exists multiple maximal points 
in knowledge efficacy. 
Let’s take a look at other control variables. Labor pooling shows insignificant effects when 
we control the knowledge effect, the labor pooling does not have additional explanatory 
power for agglomeration. It provides additional evidence to suggest it is the knowledge, 
rather than labor pooling, which attracts high-tech industries to agglomerate. We also include 
other determinants for agglomeration, such as input sharing, scale economy (measured as the 
ratio of total output of the industry to number of firms in the industry), proximity to markets 
(measured as the share of industry’s sales in the total manufacturing sales, multiplied by 
province population density). Scale economy captures the effect of extending production 
scale on agglomeration, and proximity to markets captures the effect of reducing transport 
cost on agglomeration. Input sharing indicates how much a firm’s location decision depends 
on availability of intermediate suppliers. Proximity captures the importance of being closer to 
a customer market for a firm’s location decision. The tension between being closer to 
intermediate suppliers or customer markets indicates whether a firm’s location decision is 
supply-oriented or demand-oriented. We find that being in proximity to market is positively 
correlated with agglomeration, while input sharing is negatively correlated with 
agglomeration. The opposite signs of proximity and input sharing reveal the tension between 
the market and intermediate suppliers that attract high-tech firms to agglomerate. The scale 
economy is negatively correlated with agglomeration, proving that high-tech industries 
become increasingly mature, and firms tend to specialize rather than to expand production 
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and benefit from large scales (Stigler, 1951). The result shows that high-tech are more 
attracted to locate near customer markets than to locate near raw materials. High-tech 
industrial agglomeration is demand oriented rather than supply oriented. Admittedly, there 
are various unmeasured factors that affect agglomeration, such as natural resources, but due 
to data limitation, we do not include the natural variable in the regression. 
The adjusted R square is 34.6% (table 6). It reflects that the estimation model explained 
34.6% of total data variation
25
. The seemingly low adjusted R square does not draw 
important conclusions on statistically significant predictors. There are other explanatory 
variables that could affect the change in industrial agglomeration and introduce irrelevant 
variation, therefore knowledge might not be the only major contributor to industrial 
agglomeration. By excluding those explanatory variables, the effect sizes become small
26
. 
Yet the significant responsive variables still help to explain the differences in the treatment 
group with the control group in industrial agglomeration. The model predicts a reliable 
relationship
27
. The hypothesized responsive variables,                 ,     
 
    
        ,     
 
            , represent how the mean change in high-tech sectors’ industrial 
agglomeration level in policy provinces responds to heterogeneity in a non-linear way while 
assuming other variables are constant
28
.  
We also plot the relationship between heterogeneity level and knowledge efficacy 
approximated by treatment effect (figure 2). The black line shows null model’s 
approximation of the non-linear relationship between heterogeneity and treatment effect. The 
blue line shows the extended model’s approximation of the relationship. The null model and 
                                                        
25 http://blog.minitab.com/blog/adventures-in-statistics/regression-analysis-how-do-i-interpret-r-squared-and-assess-the-
goodness-of-fit 
26 http://www.theanalysisfactor.com/small-r-squared/ 
27 http://www.theanalysisfactor.com/small-r-squared/ 
28 http://blog.minitab.com/blog/adventures-in-statistics/how-to-interpret-a-regression-model-with-low-r-squared-and-low-p-
values 
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extended model show the non-linear treatment effect across high-tech sectors within 
treatment groups according to their heterogeneity level. Both models disprove the inverse U 
shape relationship between heterogeneity and knowledge efficacy. Therefore, we conclude 
that the result rules out the null hypothesis that only heterogeneity leads to maximal 
agglomeration. The null model fits the relationship between heterogeneity and knowledge 
efficacy as a quadratic approximation, while the extended model fits the relationship as a 
cubic approximation. The cubic approximation shows significant improvement in explaining 
the relationship. Both quadratic and cubic approximation show the relationship between 
agglomeration and heterogeneity exhibit a non-linear relationship that is closer to negative 
linear, providing evidence of the possibility that homogeneity leads to maximal 
agglomeration. 
4.7   Robustness Check 
4.7.1   Measure of Agglomeration 
Since the agglomeration index increases as the measurement unit is more disaggregated, the 
EG index at 4-digit sector level might overestimate the agglomeration level. For robustness 
check, we apply Ellison, Glaeser and Kerr’s (2007) EG index of coagglomeration, which 
measures a group of industries at a 2-digit level, not a particular 4-digit sector. We use 2-digit 
EG coagglomeration index as a dependent variable and compare the result with a 4-digit 
industrial EG index as robustness check. Shown in table 7, we find the result using 2-digit 
EG coagglomeration index is consistent with the base model. In the first column, the U-test 
shows negative slope at lower bound and positive slope at upper bound. T-test=3.12, 
P>|t|=0.0009. The     is rejected at 0.01 level. We disprove an inverse U shape relationship 
between heterogeneity and knowledge efficacy. 
We proceed to hypothesis 2. The F-test is 8.25 (p=0.0003), chi-squared value for LR-test is 
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16.57 (p=0.0003) and chi-squared value for Wald test is 3.55 (p=0.0287). The tests result in 
rejection of the null model and choose the extended model as a better fit. The result rules out 
the possibility that only heterogeneity leads to maximal agglomeration. The result also 
verifies an alternative hypothesis, suggesting that the extended model is better fit, providing 
there is evidence of multiple maximal points’ presence. The adjusted    is only 15.3% 
compared with 34.6% in the EG model, suggesting that 4-digit agglomeration is more closely 
related with agglomerative externalities than 2-digit coagglomeration (Rosenthal & Strange, 
2001). Consistent with the previous result (table 6), when we control for knowledge effects, 
labor pooling does not show significant effects in attracting high-tech firms to agglomerate. 
Using 4-digit industrial EG index as a measure of agglomeration, we find that being closer to 
customer, rather than being closer to intermediate suppliers is an important determinant for 
industrial agglomeration (table 6). However, when we use 2-digit aggregated industrial 
coagglomeration EG index as a measure of agglomeration to be the dependent variable, we 
find that large scale economy has positive effect on the agglomeration, while being closer to 
customers shows negative signs to previous results, and access to intermediate suppliers is 
not statistically significant (table 7). The inconsistency might be because coagglomeration is 
calculated at aggregate level (2-digit industry) and the scale economy, input sharing and 
proximity to markets variables do not reflect the true effects when it was estimated at 
disaggregate level.  
Given the estimates of the coagglomeration regression model, we plot the relationship 
between heterogeneity and knowledge efficacy (figure 3). The result is consistent with the 
base model. The null model shows a U shape relationship. The extended model shows as 
heterogeneity increases, the graph goes down; it then goes up as heterogeneity continues to 
increase. Both the null model and extended model disprove the theory that only heterogeneity 
maximized knowledge efficacy. The graph shows evidence that homogeneity leads to 
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maximal knowledge efficacy. 
4.7.2  Measure of Labor Pooling 
We use an employment variable as an alternative proxy for labor pooling to capture the size 
effect of the labor pool: matches between industrial specific skills and employers attract firms 
to agglomerate. The result is shown in table 8. In column (1), the coefficient for        
  
         is positive and significant at the 0.01 level, the coefficient for                  is 
negative and significant at the 0.01 level. T-test is1.37, and p-value is 0.0856. The U-test 
rejects     at 0.1 level. The result is consistent with base model. 
The U-test for inverse U shape does not reject the null, disproving the inverse U shape 
relationship between heterogeneity and knowledge efficacy. In column (2), the coefficient for 
       
           is negative, the coefficient for        
           is positive and the 
coefficient for                  is negative. All the parameters are significant at 0.01 level. 
The F statistics is 3.4 (p=0.0651), chi-squared value in Wald test is 4.24 (p=0.0144). The 
result shows that the extended model significantly improves the null model in explaining the 
data. Both the base model and extended model support that the homogeneity leads to 
maximal agglomeration. The high-tech firms are attracted to being closer to customer 
markets rather than raw materials. We noticed that when we use employment to measure 
labor pooling effect, it shows a positive effect on agglomeration, though the magnitude is 
close to zero (0.000001). The result is consistent with the base model, showing that when we 
control for knowledge effect, labor pooling does not add much additional information to 
explain agglomeration. 
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Plotting the relationship between heterogeneity level and knowledge efficacy, we found the 
result is consistent with base model (figure 4). The null model shows a U shape curve and the 
extended model shows that knowledge efficacy first decreases then increases as heterogeneity 
increases. Both models disprove the theory that maximal knowledge efficacy only exists in a 
heterogeneity level. The graph shows that homogeneity leads to maximal knowledge 
efficacy. 
4.7.3  Heterogeneity Measurement 
One concern with the heterogeneity variable is that the resilience of new product to 
exogenous production shock might not specifically pick up heterogeneous knowledge types. 
A higher level of heterogeneity might arise from diverse knowledge types, but also arise from 
the fact that a firm has multiple production functions. We apply alternative measurement for 
heterogeneity for a robustness check.  
The Theil index measures a sector’s production diversity degree. Jacob (1969) argues that 
geographically proximate diversified industries, rather than specialized industries, promotes 
innovation (Glaeser et al., 1992). The Theil index intends to capture Jacob’s knowledge 
externality. Following Greunz (2004), the Theil index is defined as follows: 
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where     is Theil diversity for sector s in province j,    is the average employment in sector 
s, z stands for the zth firm, n is number of firms in sector s. A higher value of     higher 
diversity, and     is bound within [0,1]. The result is shown in table 9. 
  113 
Table 9 shows estimation using Theil’s index as a measure of heterogeneity. In column (1), 
the U-test shows the presence of an inverse U shape curve at the 0.01 significant level. We 
cannot conclude that only heterogeneity leads to maximal knowledge efficacy until we reject 
the extended model in hypothesis 2. In column (2), the test shows consistent results 
supporting the extended model. The F-test statistics value is 17.00, and the p-value associated 
with F statistics is 0.0000. The chi-squared value calculated from the LR-test is 34.02 
(p=0.0000) and from Wald test is 16.99 (p=0.0000). The p-value is less than 0.01, so we 
reject the null model and conclude that cubic term of heterogeneity is not simultaneously 
equal to zero
29
 (significant at 0.01 level). Including the cubic term significantly improves the 
fitness of the model. High-tech firms intend to locate closer to consumers’ market rather than 
suppliers. Conditioning on knowledge externality, abundant intermediate suppliers cause 
congestion diseconomies, and deter high-tech firms from agglomerating (Jofre-Monseny et 
al., 2011). High-tech firms tend to specialize and shrink their sizes rather than expand 
production.  
Figure 5 shows the curve for the relationship between heterogeneity and knowledge efficacy. 
The significant inverse U shape represents part of extended model. The F-test, LR test and 
Wald test choose extended model as better model. The plot shows two knowledge efficacy 
maximal points, one occurs at boundary the other occurs at heterogeneity*>0. The result 
disproves that only heterogeneity leads to maximal knowledge efficacy. 
4.7.4   Binary Dependent Variable 
Ellison-Glaeser index measures a sector’s concentration level. A sector is considered as very 
concentrated when EG index is greater than 0.05 (Glenn Ellison & Glaeser, 1997). We create 
a binary variable                                              We use a logit 
                                                        
29 http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/mult_pkg/faq/general/nested_tests.htm 
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model to investigate how heterogeneity contributes to the treated high-tech sector’s 
likelihood of being very concentrated. The regression result is shown in table 10. In U-test, t-
test is 3.02 and p-value is 0.0013. U-test rejects     at 0.01 level. It disproves that an optimal 
heterogeneity level maximizes the probability of treated high-tech sectors to be very 
concentrated. 
In hypothesis 2, the likelihood ratio test shows extended model significantly improves fitness 
to data. Both LR test and Wald test shows that cubic polynomial significantly improves 
fitness to the data. Both null model and extended model presents approximately U shape 
relationship between heterogeneity and likelihood of the sector bing very concentrated. 
Therefore we draw conclusion that being less heterogeneous contributes to high-sector’s 
likelihood of being very concentrated. Noticeably, we cannot draw meaningful interpretation 
for the magnitude of coefficient, as they do not reflect the marginal effect in logit models. 
Using the estimates of logit regression model, we plot the curve for the relationship between 
heterogeneity and knowledge efficacy (figure 6). The null model shows the relationship is 
decreasing at the left hand side of the interval (Lind & Mehlum, 2007); disproving the 
presence of inverse U shape relationship between heterogeneity and knowledge efficacy. The 
extended model decreases at low values of the interval and quickly increases as heterogeneity 
increases. The result is consistent with base model. We disprove that only heterogeneity leads 
to maximal knowledge efficacy.  
4.7.5  Cluster Analysis 
Another robustness check is to examine the relationship between heterogeneity and 
agglomeration by sector. We are interested in which sector is homogeneous and very 
agglomerated, homogeneous and not agglomerated, heterogeneous and very agglomerated, 
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heterogeneous and not agglomerated. Figure 7 shows scatter plot of EG verses heterogeneous 
for 4-digit high-tech sectors. Different legend represent 2-digit industries. Briefly, 
Manufacture of Special Purpose Machinery, Manufacture of Electrical Machinery and 
Equipment, Manufacture of Computer, Manufacture of  Measuring Instrument are more 
homogeneous; while Processing of Petroleum, Manufacture of Medicine, Manufacture of 
Chemical Fiber are more heterogeneous. Using  Ellison and Glaeser (1997) criteria, EG index 
greater than 0.05 is considered as “very agglomerated”. The dot line indicates the EG=0.05 
threshold. Within 2-digit industries, sectors vary in terms of agglomeration and heterogeneity 
level. For example, heterogeneous and very agglomerated sectors include: Veterinary drug 
manufacture, Chemical fiber pulp manufacture; homogeneous and very agglomerated sectors 
include: Other special equipment manufacture, Other instruments manufacture; 
heterogeneous and not agglomerated sectors include: Chemical technical manufacture, Nylon 
fiber manufacture; homogeneous and not agglomerated sectors include: Nuclear 
measurement instrument manufacture, Medical, surgical and veterinary instrument 
manufacture. 
The scatter plot indicates that some sectors are more influenced from heterogeneity, while 
some are less influenced. We proceed to examine the behavior of estimated coefficients.  
       ,        
 , and        
  are of our primary interests. We regress sector’s agglomeration 
on        ,        
 , and        
  for each high-tech sector, and construct cluster analysis on 
estimated parameters. We aim to assign the 4-digit high-tech sectors to groups, so that sectors 
within a group are similar to one another based on        ,        
 , and        
  as attributes of 
interest
30. “Group” refers to “cluster” in cluster analysis.  
                                                        
30 http://www.yorku.ca/ptryfos/f1500.pdf 
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Agglomerative hierarchical clustering analysis is utilized to determine clusters. This analysis 
aims to identify hierarchical interrelationships between the high-tech sectors according to 
heterogeneity attributes. It compares dissimilarity between observations and merges the most 
similar observations into groups. The procedure is iterated until all observations merge into 
one singleton
31. “Hierarchy” refers to level of dissimilarity. The higher the merge level, the 
more dissimilarity between clusters. The Wald method calculates squared Euclidian distance 
and is used to determine dissimilarity between sectors. The result (figure 8) shows that 
heterogeneity variables,        ,        
 , and        
 , exhibit most similar impact between 
Chinese Medicine Processing Manufacturing and Other Special Equipment Manufacturing; 
between Construction Machinery Manufacturing and Other Specialized Chemical Products 
Manufacturing; and between Compound Fertilizer Material Manufacturing and Mining 
Equipment Manufacturing. Nitrogen Fertilizer Manufacturing shows more dissimilar effect 
from heterogeneity than other high-tech sectors.  
4.8   Conclusion 
This chapter models and tests the relationship between heterogeneity and knowledge efficacy. 
It asks the research question: does only heterogeneity lead to maximal knowledge efficacy? 
We proposed two hypotheses to investigate this question. The first hypothesis is that 
heterogeneity leads to maximal knowledge efficacy; the second is that there exists only one 
maximal knowledge efficacy. The previous chapter (Wang, 2015) shows China’s skilled 
labor migration liberalization policy increases high-tech industrial agglomeration. The skilled 
labor pool affects industrial agglomeration through both labor pooling effect and knowledge 
effect. Controlling for labor pooling effect, we empirically test the knowledge effect from the 
fact that knowledge generates heterogeneous treatment effects across 4-digit high-tech 
                                                        
31 http://www.cs.princeton.edu/courses/archive/spr08/cos424/slides/clustering-2.pdf 
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sectors within policy provinces according to their level of heterogeneity. Knowledge efficacy 
is approximated by the treatment effect that skilled labor increases industrial agglomeration. 
The result disproves the theory that only heterogeneity leads to maximal knowledge efficacy, 
providing evidence that homogeneity leads to maximal knowledge efficacy and that there 
exist multiple maximal points in knowledge efficacy. 
Still, this paper leaves questions unaddressed. Using the production shock, volatility is an 
imperfect proxy for heterogeneity; we need to look for better heterogeneity variables to 
capture the horizontal knowledge differences between agents. Second, the policy implication 
of understanding the relationship between heterogeneity and knowledge efficacy needs to be 
explored. How should policy makers design preferable policies so that different categories of 
firms benefit most from knowledge spillover in agglomeration? Third, the knowledge 
exchange model only analyzes two agents’ cases, and it imposes a strong assumption of 
asymmetry. It would be interesting to model multiple agents’ knowledge exchange models 
and relax the assumptions in the theatrical model. In the future, we could also incorporate 
vertical heterogeneity with the horizontal heterogeneity in knowledge creation process. In 
sum, this chapter uses treatment from a skilled labor policy as proxy for knowledge efficacy 
in agglomeration and examines the relationship between heterogeneity and knowledge 
efficacy. This chapter provides a nuanced perspective on knowledge spillover effect in 
agglomeration and also orients future research. 
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4.10  Tables and Figures 
Table 4.1 Summary EG index for Industrial Agglomeration  
 Mean SD Count 
Processing of Food from Agricultural Products 0.0728 0.1540  92,229  
Manufacture of Foods 0.1292 0.2612  6,477  
Manufacture of Beverage 0.0431 0.1211  8,312  
Manufacture of Tobacco 0.0119 0.0185  159  
Manufacture of Textile 0.0860 0.1645  87,622  
Manufacture of Textile Wearing, Apparel, Footwear and 
Caps 
0.0212 0.0314 
 
102,836  
Manufacture of Leather, Fur, Feather and Its Products 0.0378 0.0627  19,378  
Processing of limbers, Manufacture of Wood, Bamboo, 
Rattan, Palm and Straw Products 
0.0239 0.0449  15,910  
Manufacture of Furniture 0.1170 0.2605  9,542  
Manufacture of Paper and Paper Products 0.0538 0.0820  40,975  
Printing, Reproduction of Recording Media 0.0637 0.1240  14,337  
Manufacture of Articles for Culture, Education and Sport 
Activities 
0.0534 0.0835  8,893  
Processing of Petroleum, Coking, Processing of Nuclear 
Fuel 
0.0645 0.0664  5,683  
Manufacture of Chemical Raw Material and Chemical 
Products 
0.0712 0.1357  39,874  
Manufacture of Medicines 0.0522 0.0785  9,072  
Manufacture of Chemical Fiber 0.0447 0.0382  2,121  
Manufacture of Rubber 0.0190 0.0191  4,423  
Manufacture of Plastic 0.0480 0.0748  40,397  
Manufacture of Non-metallic Mineral Products 0.0391 0.0842 
 
107,432  
Manufacture and Processing of Ferrous Metals 0.0751 0.1077  15,715  
Manufacture and processing of Non-ferrous Metals 0.0364 0.0494  10,802  
Manufacture of Metal Products 0.0885 0.2107  37,008  
Manufacture of General Purpose Machinery 0.0774 0.1864  52,131  
Manufacture of Special Purpose Machinery 0.1262 0.2906  18,483  
Manufacture of Transport Equipment 0.0476 0.1179  62,710  
Manufacture of Electrical Machinery and Equipment 0.0795 0.1908  33,551  
Manufacture of Communication Equipment, Computer 
and Other Electronic Equipment 
0.1993 0.3641  27,031  
Manufacture of Measuring Instrument and Machinery for 
Cultural Activity and Office Work 
0.1842 0.3409  5,038  
Manufacture of Artwork, Other Manufacture 0.0277 0.0459  19,336  
Recycling and Disposal of Waste 0.0211 0.0324  1,013  
Source: Annual Survey of Industrial Firms 1998-2007 
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Table 4.2 Coagglomeration-adjusted Index Summary Statistics by Industry 
 Mean SD Count 
Processing of Food from Agricultural Products 0.0269 0.0323 
 
176,857  
Manufacture of Foods 0.0752 0.1477  87,239  
Manufacture of Beverage 0.1021 0.3054  32,876  
Manufacture of Tobacco 0.0561 0.0790  1,671  
Manufacture of Textile 0.0721 0.1408 
 
131,818  
Manufacture of Textile Wearing, Apparel, Footwear 
and Caps 
0.2387 0.1783  25,943  
Manufacture of Leather, Fur, Feather and Its Products 0.0835 0.0795  56,348  
Processing of limbers, Manufacture of Wood, 
Bamboo, Rattan, Palm and Straw Products 
0.0350 0.0405  61,680  
Manufacture of Furniture 0.1777 0.7509  14,352  
Manufacture of Paper and Paper Products 0.0324 0.0597  22,722  
Printing, Reproduction of Recording Media 0.2177 0.5333  14,479  
Manufacture of Articles for Culture, Education and 
Sport Activities 
0.0761 0.0470  23,590  
Processing of Petroleum, Coking, Processing of 
Nuclear Fuel 
0.0774 0.0828  8,680  
Manufacture of Chemical Raw Material and Chemical 
Products 
0.0702 0.0988 
 
223,034  
Manufacture of Medicines 0.0326 0.0885  31,239  
Manufacture of Chemical Fiber 0.2657 0.8959  13,233  
Manufacture of Rubber 0.1053 0.1170  29,206  
Manufacture of Plastic 0.0445 0.0819 
 
126,945  
Manufacture of Non-metallic Mineral Products 0.0491 0.0488 
 
257,369  
Manufacture and Processing of Ferrous Metals 0.0711 0.1228  56,232  
Manufacture and processing of Non-ferrous Metals 0.0763 0.0730  55,558  
Manufacture of Metal Products 0.0808 0.1356 
 
171,230  
Manufacture of General Purpose Machinery 0.0796 0.0610 
 
234,507  
Manufacture of Special Purpose Machinery 0.1222 0.1475 
 
145,350  
Manufacture of Transport Equipment 0.1619 0.7025 
 
153,649  
Manufacture of Electrical Machinery and Equipment 0.0823 0.0605 
 
187,106  
Manufacture of Communication Equipment, 
Computer and Other Electronic Equipment 
0.0810 0.0893 
 
104,441  
Manufacture of Measuring Instrument and Machinery 
for Cultural Activity and Office Work 
0.0902 0.0635  49,270  
Manufacture of Artwork, Other Manufacture 0.0944 0.3117  62,865  
Recycling and Disposal of Waste 0.0917 0.1234  2,415  
Source: Annual Survey of Industrial Firms 1998-2007 
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Table 4.3 Summary Statistics of Variables 
  
25
th
 
Percentile 
50
th
 
Percentile 
75
th
 
Percentile Mean 
Standard 
Error of 
Mean 
Heterogeneity 0.004 0.010 0.030 0.149 0.022 
Labor Pooling1 0.000 0.002 0.007 0.022 0.001 
Input Sharing 0.800 0.839 0.871 0.817 0.000 
Employment  50   100   212   242  0.704 
Sales (billion) 40.710 133.450 421.500 388.405 0.422 
Input (billion) 29.940 104.920 342.670 326.993 0.457 
Firm Number  94   261   576   512  0.457 
Source: author’s calculation of Annual Survey of Industrial Firms 1998-2007 and China Industry Economy Statistical 
Yearbook 2001-2010 Note: Heterogeneity, Labor Pooling, Input Sharing is measured at 4-digit sector level; Employment is 
measured at firm level; Sales, Purchased Inputs and Firm Number is measured at 2-digit industrial level. Standard Error of 
Mean is calculated as standard deviation divided by square root of n. 
 
 
Table 4.4 Variables Correlation  
 Heterogeneity Labor pooling1 Input sharing Proximity Scale 
economy 
Heterogeneity 1     
Labor pooling1 0.0039 1    
Input sharing 0.0013 0.0015 1   
Proximity -0.0015 0.0058 0.1250
***
 1  
Scale economy -0.0020 0.0025 -0.0552
*** 
0.3160
***
 1 
*p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 4.5 Correlation Between Skill Intensity and Heterogeneity 
                                                             
               
Skill 
1 0.00656
***
 0.00503
**
 0.00385
*
 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
Table 4.6 Base Estimation Result for EG index 
 (1) (2) 
                 -0.322967
***
 -0.475111
***
 
 (0.000) (0.001) 
       
           0.127824
***
 0.431809
**
 
 (0.000) (0.024) 
       
            -0.105881
*
 
  (0.088) 
         0.051727
***
 0.053642
***
 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
        0.003040 0.015103
*
 
 (0.282) (0.098) 
       
  -0.000034 -0.000754
*
 
 (0.265) (0.073) 
       
   0.000006
*
 
  (0.068) 
          0.001348*** 0.001352*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
              -0.009418* -0.009386* 
 (0.092) (0.093) 
              0.026512* 0.023771 
 (0.094) (0.130) 
              -0.005602 -0.005758* 
 (0.105) (0.097) 
         0.049409* 0.048916* 
 (0.069) (0.072) 
Year F.E. Yes Yes 
Province F.E. Yes Yes 
Province-Year F.E. Yes Yes 
Adjusted R
2
 0.346 0.346 
     Presence of a Inverse U 
shape: 
t-test: 3.51 p-value: 0.0002  
     Null Model 
     Extended Model 
 F-test: 4.24 p-value: 0.0144 
 LR chi-square 8.55 p-value 
0.0139 
 Wald test 4.24   p-value 0.0144 
p-values in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 4.7 Estimation with Coagglomeration Index 
 (1) (2) 
                 -1.946238 -3.123189
*
 
 (0.106) (0.099) 
       
           1.371037
*
 4.321929
*
 
 (0.073) (0.072) 
       
            -1.198728
*
 
  (0.083) 
         -0.057770 -0.024289 
 (0.503) (0.806) 
        -0.202017
***
 -0.399578
***
 
 (0.009) (0.008) 
       
  1.371037
*
 0.101427
**
 
 (0.073) (0.020) 
       
   -0.002667
**
 
  (0.023) 
              -0.064747 -0.065525 
 (0.184) (0.179) 
              0.000893 0.000903 
 (0.257) (0.254) 
              0.013323*** 0.014837*** 
 (0.007) (0.003) 
          -0.000379*** -0.000405*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
         0.062567* 0.064827* 
 (0.075) (0.066) 
Year F.E. Yes Yes 
Province F.E. Yes Yes 
Province-Year F.E. Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.152 0.153 
     Presence of a Inverse U shape: t-test: 3.12 p-value: 0.0009  
     Null Model 
     Extended Model 
 F-test: 8.25 p-value: 0.0003 
 LR-test: 16.57 p-value: 
0.0003 
 Wald test: 3.55 p-value: 
0.0287 
p-values in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01      
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Table 4.8 Estimation with Employment as Labor Pooling 
 (1) (2) 
                 -0.254428
***
 -0.445796
***
 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
       
           0.104726
***
 0.472580
***
 
 (0.001) (0.003) 
       
            -0.126777
***
 
  (0.006) 
         0.050927
***
 0.053297
***
 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
        0.003186 0.015551
*
 
 (0.261) (0.090) 
       
  -0.000035 -0.000773
*
 
 (0.247) (0.068) 
       
   0.000006
*
 
  (0.063) 
              -0.009768* -0.009722* 
 (0.081) (0.082) 
              0.000001*** 0.000001*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
              -0.005763* -0.005932* 
 (0.088) (0.080) 
          0.001364*** 0.001368*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
         0.047520* 0.046966* 
 (0.081) (0.084) 
Year F.E. Yes Yes 
Province F.E. Yes Yes 
Province-Year F.E. Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.344 0.345 
     Presence of a Inverse U shape: t-test: 1.37 p-value: 0.0856  
     Null Model 
     Extended Model 
 F-test: 3.40 p-value: 0.0651 
 LR-test: 3.43 p-value: 0.1796 
 Wald test: 4.59 p-value: 
0.0101 
p-values in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 4.9 Theil Diversity Estimation Result 
 (1) (2) 
              5.941321
***
 -69.773113
***
 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
    
           -3.336623
***
 84.556030
***
 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
    
            -33.828056
***
 
  (0.000) 
         -2.606574
***
 19.007466
***
 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
     -0.002197 0.610504
***
 
 (0.975) (0.002) 
    
  -0.061650 -0.959761
***
 
 (0.142) (0.000) 
    
   0.413993
***
 
  (0.001) 
              -0.008175*** -0.008075*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
              -0.004305** -0.004180** 
 (0.032) (0.037) 
              -0.004825*** -0.004744*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
          0.001040*** 0.001040*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
         0.104456*** -0.022196 
 (0.001) (0.646) 
Year F.E. Yes Yes 
Province F.E. Yes Yes 
Province-Year F.E. Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.203 0.203 
     Presence of Inverse U shape trivial rejection of       
     Null Model 
     Extended Model 
 F-test: 17.00 p-value: 0.0000 
 LR-test: 34.02 p-value: 
0.0000 
 Wald test: 16.99 p-value: 
0.0000 
p-values in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01      
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Table 4.10 Binary Logit Model Estimation Result 
 (1) (2) 
              -281.690253
***
 942.257619
**
 
 (0.000) (0.017) 
    
           154.109217
***
 -1222.671512
***
 
 (0.000) (0.009) 
    
            515.119558
***
 
  (0.005) 
         128.224126
***
 -233.636789
**
 
 (0.000) (0.035) 
        -83.436412
***
 235.765633
***
 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
       
  49.303350
***
 -348.413623
***
 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
       
   162.737557
***
 
  (0.000) 
              1.833221*** 1.848044*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
              -0.182187 -0.240722 
 (0.351) (0.223) 
              -0.453644*** -0.430167*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
          -0.030590*** -0.030495*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Year F.E. No No 
Province F.E. No No 
Province-Year F.E. No No 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes 
     Presence of a Inverse U 
shape: 
t-test: 3.02 p-value: 0.0013  
              
                  
 LR-test: 97.58 p-value: 
0.0000 
 Wald test: 97.67 p-value: 
0.0000 
p-values in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Figure 4.1 Relationship Between Heterogeneity and Knowledge Efficacy  
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Figure 4.2 Relationship between Heterogeneity and Knowledge Efficacy Base Model 
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Figure 4.3 Relationship of Heterogeneity and Knowledge Coagglomeration Model 
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Figure 4.4 Relationship between Heterogeneity and Knowledge Employment Model 
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Figure 4.5 Relationship between Heterogeneity and Knowledge Theil Index Model 
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Figure 4.6 Relationship between Heterogeneity and Knowledge Efficacy Logit Model 
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Figure 4.7 Scatter plot of Heterogeneity and EG in Industry 
Panel A 
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Figure 4.7 (cont.)  
Panel B
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Figure 4.8 Hierarchical Cluster Analysis of High-tech Sectors 
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CHAPTER 5   
  SUMMARY 
My thesis uses a natural experiment in China to investigate the response of Chinese firms’ 
location decision towards a labor policy liberalizing skilled workers’ interregional migration. 
My thesis examines the impact of talent pool and knowledge availability on industrial 
agglomeration. My work studies three aspects of agglomeration in this setting: whether 
liberalizing interregional skilled labor mobility facilitates high-tech industrial agglomeration; 
whether Food Processing co-locate in order to access talent pool; whether heterogeneity 
alone leads to maximal knowledge efficacy.  
In Chapter 2, I assess the impact of eligibility for permanent residency in cities for high-
educated/high-skilled (HEHS) labor and Talent Residence Permit (TRP) policy on the 
agglomeration of Chinas high-tech manufacturing industries. The research hypothesis is that 
HEHS labor immobility slows down high-tech industrial agglomeration. I estimated the 
response of the industrial agglomeration when liberalizing HEHS migration and found that a 
positive impact of policy on high-tech industrial agglomeration; revealed that skilled labor 
immobility slows down high-tech industrial agglomeration.  
In Chapter 3, I conduct a case study on the Chinese food processing industry. I utilize a 
propensity score-matching model to test the hypothesis that the food processing agglomerate 
in order to access talent pool. I find evidence that the skilled labor pool affected the location 
decision of food processing firms in China. The result supports recent literature that the food 
and agribusiness sector is increasingly dependent on knowledge workers and high technology. 
Other traditional determinants for industrial agglomeration include scale economies and 
proximity to markets, which also promote industrial agglomeration in the food processing 
industry.  
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Chapter 4 disentangles the knowledge effect imposed on a skilled labor pool that increases 
high-tech industrial agglomeration. It takes a closer scrutiny on the policy’s treatment effect 
on 4-digit high-tech sectors. It finds that the policy treatment effect is nonidentical across 
high-tech sectors according to their heterogeneity level. Using data from the Annual Survey 
of Industrial Firms, which include 572,000 firms from 1998-2007, the result disproves the 
theory that heterogeneity alone maximizes knowledge efficacy, and provides evidence that 
homogeneity leads to maximal knowledge efficacy. 
In summary, I use a unique policy experiment in China to empirically diagnose the 
agglomeration mechanism operating through skilled labor pooling. I am able to dig further to 
understand the interaction between skilled labor mobility, knowledge accumulation and 
agglomeration economies. In future work, I will investigate the circular causation of labor 
and firms location decisions: do workers follow jobs or vice versa? Last but not least, the 
welfare issue is of urgent necessity. The policy targets on high-skilled/high-educated 
employees, however, to study the indispensable contribution of low-skilled workers in 
agglomeration economies is of equal importance. The selective migration policy is found to 
benefit knowledge accumulation as well as agglomeration economies, yet it might also have 
economic and social costs, such as inequality between high-skilled and low-skilled social 
classes, and interregional disparities due to skilled labor migration. The wage differential 
might drive migration and lead to persistent regional disparity. All these issues lead to future 
research.  
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APPENDIX 
A.1  Different Definition for High-tech Industries 
For comparison, this study employs different methods to define the high-tech industries.  
China Statistical Yearbook of Science and Technology (CSST) defines High-tech industries 
as: 1) Manufacture of Medicines; 2) Manufacture of Aircraft and Spacecraft; 3) Manufacture 
of Electronic Equipment and Communication Equipment; 4) Manufacture of Computers and 
Office Equipment; 5) Manufacture of Medical Equipment and Meters.  The Industry code 
applied in this analysis is the two-digit manufacture industries according to National 
Industries Classification (GB/T 4754 2002). There is “comparability” as well as 
“discrepancies” (Hiroki, et al., 2009) in both CSST and GB/T 4754. Manufacture of Aircraft 
and Spacecraft is coded as subsector #376 under two-digit #37 Manufacture of Transport 
Equipment in GB/T 4754; Manufacture of Computers is coded #404 under two-digit #40 
Manufacture of Communication Equipment, Computer and Other Electronic Equipment in 
GB/T 4754; Manufacture of Office Equipment is coded #415 under two-digit #41 
Manufacture of Measuring Instrument and Machinery for Cultural Activity and Office Work 
in GB/T 4754; Manufacture of Medical Equipment is coded #368 under two-digit #36 
Manufacture of Special Purpose Machinery. Manufacture of Meters is coded #411 under two-
digit #41 Manufacture of Measuring Instrument and Machinery for Cultural Activity and 
Office Work. We match the high-tech industries to the GB/T 4754 two-digit industry code 
and define high-tech industries as: 1) Manufacture of Medicines; 2) Manufacture of Special 
Purpose Machinery; 3) Manufacture of Transport Equipment; 4) Manufacture of 
Communication Equipment, Computer and Other Electronic Equipment and 5) Manufacture 
of Measuring Instrument and Machinery for Cultural Activity and Office Work (table 1). 
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Table A.1 Matching of CSST to GB/T code 
CSST High-tech Industries GB/T 4754 2002 
Description 2-digit Code Description 
Manufacture of Medicines 27 Manufacture of Medicines 
Manufacture of Aircrafts and Spacecrafts 37 Manufacture of Transport Equipment 
Manufacture of Electronic Equipment and 
Communication Equipment 
40 
Manufacture of Communication 
Equipment, Computer and Other 
Electronic Equipment 
Manufacture of Computers and Office 
Equipment 
40 
Manufacture of Communication 
Equipment, Computer and Other 
Electronic Equipment 
Manufacture of Medical Equipment 36 
Manufacture of Special Purpose 
Machinery 
Manufacture of Meters 41 
Manufacture of Measuring Instrument 
and Machinery for Cultural Activity 
and Office Work 
 Sources: China Statistical Yearbook of Science and Technology, GB/T 4754-2002 
The estimation model uses CSST high-tech industries in policy provinces within effective 
years as treatment variables. The treatment dummy variable in the CSST Dummy Treatment 
model is computed as: ( )               (          
 )   (         
         
 )   (                  );  
The continuous treatment variable in the CSST Continuous Treatment model is computed as:  
(  )              
 (          
 )   (                  
 )                     (    
              );  
The result is robust in both the CSST Dummy Treatment model and the CSST Continuous 
Treatment model, showing a positive correlation between TRP eligibility and high-tech 
industrial agglomeration (table 2). However, the significance level falls in both models. One 
possible explanation would be that CSST Dummy Treatment model does not coincide with 
all industries that are more R&D employment intensive than the average, resulting in 
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inconsistencies with the low-tech classification. For example, Manufacture of 
Communication Equipment, Computer and Other Electronic Equipment has an R&D share 
1.28 times the average in 2001, and falls to 78% of the average in 2002. Manufacture of 
Transport Equipment has an R&D share of 65% of the average in 2002, and increases to 1.85 
times the average in 2006. 
Purchased inputs are negatively correlated with the location quotient, revealing a negative 
disintegration effect on high-tech industrial agglomeration.  The coefficient is statistically 
significant at the 95% level both in the CSST Dummy Treatment Model and CSST 
Continuous Treatment model.  
The coefficient for scale Economies and proximity are quite close for the CSST Dummy 
Treatment Model and CSST Continuous Treatment model. The result for increasing returns 
and scale economies is also robust, showing a positive although moderate relationship with 
high-tech industrial agglomeration. Greater scale economies lead to a higher location 
quotient. The proximity coefficient is positive and statistically significant.  This relationship 
shows that proximity to markets and customers will lead to higher level of high-tech 
industrial agglomeration.  
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Table A.2 CSST Treatment Estimation Result 
 
Dummy Treatment Model Continuous Treatment Model 
TRPdummyijt 0.0281
*
  
 
(0.091)  
   
TRPcontinuousijt  0.0031 
 
 (0.561) 
   
Vertical Disintegration -0.0348
**
 -0.0353
**
 
 
(0.015) (0.013) 
 
  
Scale Economy 0.0037
***
 0.0036
***
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
  
Proximity 0.0045
***
 0.0045
***
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
   
Constant 0.7039
***
 0.7030
***
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Year Effects Yes Yes 
Province Effects Yes Yes 
Year*Province Yes Yes 
Observations 20042 20042 
Adjusted R
2
 0.250 0.250 
p-values in parentheses 
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01   
A.2  Market Potential  
Market potential variable measures demand, indicating how downstream demand linkages 
that extend across geography could have possible influences on firms’ location decisions 
(Hanson, 2005). Market potential is an indicator for “centrality” (Schulze, 2007, p. 6), all 
other things equal, producers incline to locate near central rather than periphery, where they 
could access markets most easily. The estimation strategy including market potential variable 
has been constructed. In particular, the unobserved time-invariant variables are controlled by 
first-differenced market potential (Hanson, 2005). We assume the error term is uncorrelated 
with the time-differenced market potential variable. The estimation strategy becomes: 
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Table 3 shows that the time-invariant market potential presents significant negative effects on 
industrial agglomeration (-0.0028). Higher downstream demand and shorter distance 
indicates an decrease in high-tech industrial agglomeration(Hanson, 2005). The result shows 
those regions with faster increase in market potential growth will have relatively lower 
industrial agglomeration (Schulze, 2007). The possible explanation could be that even though 
greater consumer demand products in accessible markets might stimulate the production in 
the particular province, shorter distance to the particular province accessing markets could 
reduce the transport costs, the fierce local completion outbids the benefits and therefore 
decrease the attractiveness of the particular province to industries. We found that though the 
market access motivation could explain part of the firms’ location decision, being closer to 
HEHS labor pool and other traditional agglomeration determinants still have strong 
explanatory power (Head & Mayer, 2004). In the continuous treatment model specification, 
we noticed that time-differenced market potential shows significant and negative effects on 
high-tech industrial agglomeration. It reveals that as industry becomes more skill intensive, 
i.e. with higher relative R&D share to average, the probability of a firm to locate in a 
particular region decreases as the market potential grows faster in that region (Head & 
Mayer, 2004). 
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Table A.3 Time-invariant Market Potential Estimation Model 
 Dummy Treatment Continuous Treatment 
TRPijt 0.1558
***
 0.0034 
 (0.001) (0.777) 
   
Vertical Disintegration -0.0010 -0.0020 
 (0.977) (0.952) 
   
Scale Economy 0.0085
***
 0.0082
***
 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Proximity 0.0060
***
 0.0060
***
 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Differenced Market Potential -0.0028
*
 -0.0028
*
 
 (0.075) (0.082) 
   
Constant 0.6045
***
 0.6282
***
 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Year Fixed Effects 
Province Fixed Effects 
Year*Province 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Observations 5026 5026 
Adjusted R
2
 0.158 0.156 
p-values in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
There are some shortcomings with using Harris (1954) market potential index. First, it uses 
final consumption as demand and ignores the possible intermediate demand from inter-
industry linkages (Bai, Ma, & Pan, 2012); second, it does not gauge the border effects,  
policy tariff and local competition in the demand measurement (Head & Mayer, 2004). 
Even when we control for market potential, the TRP policy effects are still significant and 
positive, and other traditional determinants for agglomeration economies, like scale economy 
and being closer to demand still have strong explanatory power in high-tech industrial 
agglomeration. Our analysis differs from traditional market potential literatures that this 
paper assesses the importance of market access on firms’ location decision, while traditional 
literatures examine market potential as channel that might transit economic shock in one 
location to income distribution and economic growth in other locations, leading to inter-
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regional disparity and labor migration flow (Bai et al., 2012; Hanson, 2005; Head & Mayer, 
2004). 
A.3  Spatial Pattern 
Here we take a look at the spatial distribution of location quotient for a particular high-tech 
industry, medicine manufacturing in 2010. The highest medicine manufacturing location 
quotient appears in province Jilin, Beijing and Jiangxi. Generally the location quotient 
decreases from the eastern coastal areas to inland areas (figure 1). It provides an intuitive 
view of the spatial pattern of high-tech industry’s location quotient. 
Figure A.1 Medicine Manufacturing Location Quotient 2010 
 
Source: China Labor Statistical Yearbook, China Industry Economy Statistical Yearbook, authors’ calculation  
Note: 1 denotes TRP policy provinces, 0 denotes non-policy provinces 
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We also apply hot spot analysis to detect the clusters of medicine manufacturing location 
quotient. Hot spot analysis calculates the Getis-Ord Gi-star statistic as follows
32
:  
  
  
∑        
 
   
∑   
 
   
 
∑     
 
   
√
∑   
  
   
  (
∑   
 
   
 )
 
 
where    is medicine manufacturing location quotient value in province j in year 2010;      is 
the spatial weight between province i and j, where we apply rook contiguity weights; n is 
total number of provinces. For calculation, we exclude Hainan Island and keep only the main 
land in China. G-star statistics calculates the Z-score, indicating the significance of spatial 
cluster. A High hot spot area indicates a cluster of high value of medicine manufacturing 
location quotient, while a cold spot area indicates a cluster of low value (figure 2). 
Figure A.2 Hot Spot Analysis for Medicine Manufacturing 2010 
 
Source: China Labor Statistical Yearbook, China Industry Economy Statistical Yearbook, authors’ calculation  
Note: 1 denotes TRP policy provinces, 0 denotes non-policy provinces 
                                                        
32 http://help.arcgis.com/en/arcgisdesktop/10.0/help/index.html#//005p00000011000000 
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We further examine the spatial autocorrelation using the Moran’s I index (Anselin, 1995), 
calculated as follows: 
  
∑ ∑     
 
   
 
   (    ̅)(    ̅)
(∑ ∑     
 
   
 
   )
∑ (    ̅) 
 
   
 
 
where    and    is medicine manufacturing location quotient value in province i and j 
respectively;      is the spatial weight between province i and j, we use rook contiguity 
weights; n is total number of provinces. Positive Moran’s I implies positively correlation 
across provinces for medicine manufacturing location quotient, and the correlation is 
significant at 0.1 level (table 4).  
Table A.4 Medicine Manufacturing 2010 Moran's I test 
Moran I Statistics Expectation Variance 
0.0637 -0.0033 0.0016 
Standard deviate = 1.6819 
P-value = 0.0926 
A.4  Overview of Missing Data 
Table A.5 Missing Data  
Variable 
Food 
Processing 
Instrument 
Manufacturing 
(HEHS) 
All 
Manufacturing 
Vertical Integration 0 14 159 
 
0.00% 4.52% 2.56% 
Scale Economy 0 13 141 
 
0.00% 4.19% 2.27% 
Proximity 31 31 620 
 
10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 
Total Imputed Data 31 58 920 
    
Observations  310   310   6,200  
    
% Imputed Data 10.0% 18.7% 14.8% 
Source: authors’ calculation of China Labor Statistical Yearbook, China Industry Economy Statistical Yearbook  
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A.5  IV Estimation 
IV estimation is conducted as robustness check. First we construct an indirect measure of 
knowledge. Then we use heterogeneity within high-tech sectors in policy provinces as 
instrument for the knowledge variable to address the measurement error issue. We show that 
the endogenous knowledge variable has significant positive correlation with agglomeration. 
We use the share of R&D employment as a proxy for knowledge. Because measurement 
might involve measurement error and that biases the estimated result, we apply the IV 
strategy. The instrument variable should be correlated with deterministic characteristics of 
knowledge (skills, spatial proximity, face-to-face interactions), but be uncorrelated with 
idiosyncratic characteristics on agglomeration (Kirwan, 2009). The TRP skilled labor policy 
affects agglomeration through two possible ways: knowledge and labor pooling. Controlling 
for labor pooling effect, knowledge is the only mechanism that the policy influence high-tech 
sectors in policy provinces. The knowledge effect varies across high-tech sectors in policy 
provinces according to their heterogeneity level. Therefore, the interaction of heterogeneity 
and treatment variable could be a potential instrument.   
                                                            
          
          
                    
           
  
One challenge of this potential instrument variable is that it may fail the exclusive condition. 
We concern that implementation of TRP policy is not exogenous, in other words, a province 
with a higher level of preexisting agglomeration would be more likely to adopt the TRP 
policy. We consider using the spatial lag variable, that is, neighboring provinces to take care 
of the endogeneity issue. Local governments imitate successful policies of neighboring 
governments to stimulate local economies (Thun, 2004).  Therefore, we reasonably assume 
that neighboring provinces would be correlated with TRP treatment variable but uncorrelated 
  151 
with idiosyncratic component for agglomeration level in that policy province. We refine our 
instrument variable and use spatial lag of TRP treatment variable and it’s interaction with 
heterogeneity as IV for knowledge spillover variable. Therefore, we apply instrument 
variable as follows: 
                                                             
 
                    
                     
           
  
The IV estimation is shown in table 6. There is strong correlation between spatial lag TRP 
policy and knowledge variable. The knowledge variable has strong positive effects on 
agglomeration, which confirm the theory that knowledge transmission facilitates the 
agglomeration economies. Consistent with the base model estimation, high-tech firms tend to 
agglomerate near customer markets. High-tech industry exhibits specialization rather 
diversity in production, therefore, scale economy deters agglomeration.  
Table A.6 IV Estimation Result 
EG  
          7.981988*** 
 (0.000) 
              0.154463*** 
 (0.000) 
              0.012488 
 (0.445) 
              -0.054533*** 
 (0.000) 
          0.001391*** 
 (0.000) 
         0.091111*** 
 (0.000) 
Year F.E. Yes 
Province F.E. Yes 
Province-Year F.E. No 
First-stage F-test 35.58 
p-values in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
  
  152 
References 
Anselin, L. (1995). Local Indicators of Spatial Association—LISA. Geographical Analysis, 
27(2), 93–115.  
Bai, C.-E., Ma, H., & Pan, W. (2012). Spatial spillover and regional economic growth in 
China. China Economic Review, 23(4), 982–990. 
Hanson, G. H. (2005). Market potential, increasing returns and geographic concentration. 
Journal of International Economics, 67(1), 1–24. 
Head, K., & Mayer, T. (2004). Market Potential and the Location of Japanese Investment in 
the European Union. Review of Economics and Statistics.  
Kirwan, B. E. (2009). The Incidence of U.S. Agricultural Subsidies on Farmland Rental 
Rates. Journal of Political Economy. 
Schulze, M.-S. (2007). Regional Income Dispersion and Market Potential in the Late 
Nineteenth Century Hapsburg Empire (No. Working Papers No. 106/07). Research 
Policy (Vol. 38). 
Thun, E. (2004). Keeping Up with the Jones’: Decentralization, Policy Imitation, and 
Industrial Development in China. World Development. 
 
